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OPERATIONALIZING FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED 
CONSENT 
Carla F. Fredericks* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(“UNDRIP”) has acknowledged varying methods in which 
international actors can protect, respect, and remedy the rights of 
indigenous peoples.1  One of these methods is the concept of free, 
prior, and informed consent (“FPIC”) as described in Articles 10, 19, 
28 and 29 of the UNDRIP.2  As this article discusses, there has been 
much debate in the international community over the legal status of 
the UNDRIP, and member states have done little to implement it.  
In applied contexts, many entities such as extractive industries and 
conservation groups are aware of risks inherent in not soliciting 
FPIC and have endeavored to create their own FPIC protocols when 
interacting with indigenous peoples.  At present, though, there is an 
absence of FPIC protocol that has been developed by indigenous 
peoples themselves.  A tribal FPIC law and protocol may serve as a 
starting point and model to implement a portion of the UNDRIP 
and actualize these rights for the development or use of culture, 
lands, territories, and resources.  This article contends that 
indigenous peoples must develop and implement their own FPIC 
protocol in order to assert their human rights, and offers a model 
 
* Director, American Indian Law Program; Associate Clinical Professor and Director, 
American Indian Law Clinic, University of Colorado Law School.  I would like to express deep 
gratitude to my research assistants, Michael Holditch and Kathleen Finn, as well as thank 
Kristen Carpenter, S. James Anaya, Sarah Krakoff, Charles Wilkinson, Fred Bloom, 
Christina Warner, Jesse Heibel, and Rich Bienstock for helpful comments, and Chairman 
David Archambault III, Jodi Gillette, Dean Depountis, Martin Wagner, Jan Hasselman, the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the Spokane Tribe of Indians, Jason Campbell, Chairwoman 
Carol Evans, Tom Fredericks, the Coalition of Large Tribes, United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Cathal Doyle, Robert 
Coulter, Elsa Stamatopoulou, Rebecca Adamson, and Nick Pelosi for the opportunity to 
experience the complexities of this topic firsthand.  Any errors are mine alone. 
1 See G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 
2007). 
2  See id., arts. 10, 19, 28, 29.  
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under United States law for Indian tribes to assert their sovereign 
and human rights without waiting for member state 
implementation. 
II.  FPIC AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
FPIC is an evolving international rights standard for entities that 
interact with indigenous peoples.3  Closely tied to the concepts of 
tribal sovereignty and self-determination, FPIC requires any entity 
engaged with a tribe in a manner that impacts tribal resources to 
first receive a tribe’s free, prior, and informed consent.4  FPIC is 
designed to replace the historical processes that excluded tribes 
from decision-making related to activities that took place on or near 
their land.5  FPIC is an international rights-based standard, 
codified in the UNDRIP, for interactions with indigenous peoples.6  
Closely tied to the concepts of tribal sovereignty and self-
determination, FPIC requires any entity engaged with a tribe in a 
manner that impacts tribal resources to first receive a tribe’s free, 
prior, and informed consent.7  FPIC is designed to replace the 
historical processes that excluded tribes from decision-making 
regarding activities that took place on or near their land.8  FPIC has 
generally been applied in the context of lands and resources, but 
may be appropriate in other settings.9 
A.  Evolution of FPIC 
A formal concept of FPIC for indigenous peoples began to emerge 
in the mid-1980s as a critical means to link to, and articulate the 
need for, self-determination for indigenous peoples.10  At the time, 
most of the conversation around FPIC concerned geographic 
 
3 See James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), Extractive 
Industries and Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/41 (July 1, 2013) [hereinafter 
Anaya, Extractive Industries]. 
4 See id. ¶¶ 28, 29. 
5 See UN-REDD Programme, Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent 11, 18 (Jan. 
2013), http://www.uncclearn.org/sites/default/files/inventory/un-redd05.pdf [hereinafter UN-
REDD Guidelines]. 
6 See id. at 14. 
 7 See Anaya, Extractive Industries, supra note 3, ¶ 27. 
 8 See UN-REDD Guidelines, supra note 5, at 18. 
 9 See Anaya, Extractive Industries, supra note 3, ¶¶ 1, 27. 
10 See Philippe Hanna & Frank Vanclay, Human Rights, Indigenous Peoples and the 
Concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent, 31 IMPACT ASSESSMENT & PROJECT APPRAISAL 
146, 150 (2013). 
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displacement of indigenous peoples.11  Indeed, in the context of 
displacement, there was an “international acceptance of the idea 
that displacement of people should not go ahead if the potentially 
affected communities found it unacceptable.”12  In light of these 
concerns, when displacement was to occur, the displacing body 
would attempt to make displacement attractive such that it would 
be voluntary.13  This practice created a norm, whereby the use of 
force and involuntary action were considered undesirable according 
to international consensus.14 
The idea of “meaningful consultation” as a part of acquiescence or 
consent of indigenous peoples grew out of the World Bank Group in 
the 1980s.15  In response to a call from indigenous peoples 
worldwide to have a convention or recognition of their rights from 
the United Nations, in September of 1984, the Working Group on 
Indigenous Peoples (“WGIP”) adopted the “Declaration of 
[P]rinciples [A]dopted at the Fourth General Assembly of the World 
Council of Indigenous Peoples in Panama.”16  These principles 
explicitly mention “free” and “informed” consent in three of the 
principles.  First, Principle 9 reads: “Indigenous people shall have 
exclusive rights to their traditional lands and its resources; where 
the lands and resources of the indigenous peoples have been taken 
away without their free and informed consent such lands and 
resources should be returned.”17  Principle 12 reads: “No action or 
course of conduct may be undertaken which, directly or indirectly, 
may result in the destruction of land, air, water, sea ice, wildlife, 
 
11 See id. 
12 Robert Goodland, Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank Group, 4 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 66, 66 (2004) [hereinafter Goodland, Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent]. 
13 See id. 
14 See Robert Goodland, The Institutionalized Use of Force in Economic Development: With 
Special Reference to the World Bank, in SUSTAINING LIFE ON EARTH: ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
HUMAN HEALTH THROUGH GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 339, 344 (Colin L. Soskolne ed., 2008) 
[hereinafter Goodland, Institutionalized Use of Force]; see also Goodland, Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent, supra note 12, at 67 (“Consent has long been a requirement for indigenous 
peoples who may potentially be impacted by a development project.”). 
15 Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); Goodland, Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent, supra note 12, at 66. 
16 Erica-Irene A. Daes (Chairman/Rapporteur on Indigenous Populations), Study of the 
Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22, 
annex III (Aug. 27, 1985) [hereinafter Daes, Discrimination against Indigenous Populations]; 
see also Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Contribution of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations to the Genesis and Evolution of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 48, 49–50 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 
2009) [hereinafter Daes, Contribution of the Working Group] (listing all seventeen principles). 
17 Daes, Contribution of the Working Group, supra note 16, at 50 (emphasis added). 
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habitat or natural resources without the free and informed consent 
of the indigenous peoples affected.”18  Finally, Principle 16 expresses 
the importance of prior consultation to the consent process: “The 
indigenous peoples and their authorities have the right to be 
previously consulted and to authorize the realization of all 
technological and scientific investigations to be conducted within 
their territories and to have full access to the results of the 
investigation.”19 
Indigenous peoples groups submitted another draft declaration 
that mentioned prior and informed consent, but it was not adopted 
at the fourth session of the WGIP.  This draft, submitted “by the 
Indian Law Resource Center, the Four Directions Council, the 
National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Service, the National Indian 
Youth Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and the 
International Indian Treaty Council[,]” was more strongly worded 
than the adopted principles.20  Among other things, the draft called 
for “free and informed consent” as to the rights to share and use 
land.21  The draft also required “prior authorization” as to the rights 
to “technical, scientific or social investigations” on indigenous 
peoples or lands.22  When negotiating the “[s]ubstantive principles” 
for the “Plan of Action of the WGIP,” there were lots of questions 
including what type of mechanism should be used to allow 
indigenous peoples control over their own “cultural and educational 
activities[.]”23 
Importantly, the concept of ethnodevelopment is related to FPIC 
and emerged about the same time as FPIC.24  Former U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Dr. Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen, developed this concept in 1985.25   Ethnodevelopment 
is essentially explicitly including ethnicity and racial differences in 
the political process, as well as the development process.26  
 
18 Id. (emphasis added). 
19 Id. (emphasis added). 
20 See id. at 51. 
21 See id. 
22 Id. at 52. 
23 See Daes, Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, supra note 16, at 56, 57. 
24 See Hanna & Vanclay, supra note 10, at 150. 
25 See id.  Stavenhagen was the first U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples.  See Office of the High 
Commissioner, U.N. Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Introduction, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/SRIndigenousPeoples/Pages/SRIPeo 
plesIndex.aspx (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).  His term was from 2001–2008.  Id. 
26 See, e.g., Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Ethnodevelopment: A Neglected Dimension in 
Development Thinking (1986), reprinted in 2 SPRINGERBRIEFS ON PIONEERS IN SCIENCE AND 
PRACTICE 65, 65 (Hans Günter Brauch ed., 2013). 
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Communities should be able to define how their resources are used 
in ways that align with their cultural context, in juxtaposition to 
Western notions of development.27  Stavenhagen wrote: “I submit 
that ethnodevelopment[,] that is, the development of ethnic groups 
within the framework of the larger society, may become a major 
issue in development thinking, both theoretically and practically.”28  
The nexus between ethnodevelopment and FPIC is rooted in the 
need for indigenous peoples to have a mechanism with which to 
negotiate during development of their lands, territories, and 
resources.  FPIC is therefore a means for an ethnically defined class 
of people (i.e., indigenous peoples) to negotiate and participate on 
their own terms, as a collective.29 
In 1989, the concept evolved further in International Labour 
Convention No. 169 (“ILO 169”), with its incorporation of “free and 
informed consent” in its principles and with ratification by member 
states; ILO 169 Articles 6 and 7 together complete the concept.30   
Scholars and indigenous peoples relied on existing human rights 
principles regarding equal rights and self-determination when later 
elaborating the concept of FPIC in the UNDRIP.31 
There has been much debate in the international community over 
the legal status of the UNDRIP.32  However, the key distinction 
establishing the UNDRIP’s non-binding legal character is that 
between soft law and hard law: 
[W]hether we like it or not, the distinction between hard law 
and soft law is a well-established one in modern 
international human rights law.  This distinction draws on 
the basics of general international law, where the list of 
legally-binding sources is limited to treaties ratified by 
states, customary international law and general principles of 
law.  Despite the specificities of the international human 
 
27 See Hanna & Vanclay, supra note 10, at 150. 
28 Stavenhagen, supra note 26, at 84. 
29 See Hanna & Vanclay, supra note 10, at 150. 
30 Id; see, e.g., Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169, 
arts. 6, 7 (June 27, 1989) [hereinafter ILO 169]. 
31 See, e.g., Hanna & Vanclay, supra note 10, at 150.  There is a timeline of the codification 
of non-indigenous FPIC requirements: the UNFAO Code of Conduct was amended in 1989 to 
include mandatory consent; the 1989 Basel Convention on hazardous wastes includes FPIC; 
the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants includes FPIC; and the 
2002 Convention on Biological Diversity also includes FPIC.  See Goodland, Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent, supra note 12, at 67. 
32 See Luis Rodríguez-Piñero Royo, “Where Appropriate”: Monitoring/Implementing of 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights under the Declaration, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE 
UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 16, at 
314, 315, 316, 317. 
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rights regime, it is nonetheless clear that the difference 
between an international treaty or convention and a 
declaration is still fully understood and applied by states, 
international organizations and other relevant operators.33 
While this hard law/soft law distinction clarifies the non-binding 
legal status of the UNDRIP, this status does not, on a practical 
level, divest the UNDRIP of legal authority entirely.34  The 
UNDRIP may itself be a “non-binding” document, but using the 
UNDRIP to sway domestic disposition is possible with domestic 
implementation.35 
The UNDRIP can function as an embodiment of international 
“principles of self-determination and cultural integrity” that 
collectively “uphold the right of indigenous peoples to maintain and 
develop their own customary law systems of self-governance.”36  The 
most recent former U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Professor James Anaya, points specifically to 
Article 33 of the draft of the UNDRIP, which states: “Indigenous 
peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their 
institutional structures and their distinctive juridical customs, 
traditions, procedures and practices, in accordance with 
 
33 Id. at 317. 
34 See, e.g., Carla F. Fredericks, Plenary Energy, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 789, 829 (2015) (“[T]he 
declaration has no influence from a purely legal standpoint.  However, [indigenous groups] . . 
. can still utilize UNDRIP as political capital to protect their rights.”). 
35 See id. at 827, 828–29, 834 (discussing how the UNDRIP is an appropriate rights-based 
framework for approving tribal energy projects); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal 
Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 116–17, 119 (2012) (exploring consent theory as applied to 
United States federal Indian law); cf. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,250 
(Nov. 6, 2000) (“Each agency shall have an accountable process to ensure meaningful and 
timely input by tribal officials in the development of regulatory policies that have tribal 
implications.  Within 30 days after the effective date of this order, the head of each agency 
shall designate an official with principal responsibility for the agency’s implementation of this 
order.  Within 60 days of the effective date of this order, the designated official shall submit to 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) a description of the agency’s consultation 
process.”). 
 36 S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move toward 
the Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13, 49, 50 (2004) [hereinafter Anaya, 
International Human Rights]; see also G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), annex, art. 1, International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1966) (“All peoples have the right 
of self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
annex, art. 1, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966) (providing 
the same language as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).   
Anaya cites to the latter two documents to exemplify his statement that “common article 1 of 
the international human rights covenants states” the following: “All peoples have the right of 
self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.”  Anaya, International Human 
Rights, supra, at 49–50; see G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 1, art. 34. 
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internationally recognised [sic] human rights standards.”37  
According to Anaya, included in these “internationally recognised 
[sic] human rights” are rights that comport with indigenous 
conceptions of ownership that have proven to be problematic 
sources of dissonance between Western culture and native 
communities throughout the course of history.38  Anaya looks 
specifically to ILO 169—providing for recognition of indigenous land 
tenure systems—in asserting that this convention “affirms the 
notion, promoted by various international institutions, that 
indigenous peoples, as groups, are entitled to a continuing 
relationship with lands and natural resources according to 
traditional patterns of use or occupancy.”39  Of course, land tenure 
itself would ensure that attendant rights regarding consent would 
be most fully protected.40 
Indeed, so-called “soft law” may be one of the most effective 
means of promoting indigenous rights through an international law 
framework.  Although the UNDRIP was adopted through a General 
Assembly Resolution,41 its status as soft law does not divest it of 
legal authority.42  Due to the intricate and dynamic processes that 
shape international law, international standards may evolve from 
all of the instruments in place, including those that are categorized 
 
 37 Anaya, International Human Rights, supra note 36, at 51.  Anaya’s article was 
published in 2004 when the UNDRIP was still a proposed draft.  Article 34 of the resulting 
UNDRIP states essentially the same as the draft: “Indigenous peoples have the right to 
promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, 
spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical 
systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards.”  G.A. Res. 
61/295, supra note 1, art. 34. 
 38 See Anaya, International Human Rights, supra note 36, at 37, 51; see generally Kristen 
A. Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 Yale L.J. 1022, 1028–29 (2009) (proposing a 
model of ownership that shifts away from individual-based property law rights and into a 
stewardship model that more aptly protects tribal interests in obtaining and enforcing 
property rights as a means of protecting cultural heritage). 
 39 Anaya, International Human Rights, supra note 36, at 40.  Article 14(1) of the 
convention states: “The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the 
lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized [sic].”  ILO 169, supra note 30, art. 
14(1). Anaya points out the significance of the present tense in the word “occupy” but also 
notes that the convention, via Article 13, allows for a constructive present “occupancy” to be 
established by showing a cultural connection to the land.  See Anaya, International Human 
Rights, supra note 36, at 40. 
40  The Dakota Access matter, discussed later, also highlights the need for land tenure to be 
considered within the context of treaty rights, even if the treaties have subsequently been 
abrogated by the State. 
41 See Mauro Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 957, 
959 (2009). 
42 See id. (“[S]oft law cannot be simply dismissed as non-law.”). 
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as binding or non-binding.43  In addition, there are many categories 
of soft law that do have governing weight, including “inter-State 
conference declarations, U.N. General Assembly resolutions, codes 
of conduct, guidelines and the recommendations of international 
organizations.”44  The array of international law and standards will 
necessarily include all instruments, particularly where normative 
aspects give the instrument its moral force.45  This is particularly 
true in the human rights context where, like in the UNDRIP, the 
content of the rights-cases framework is so important that it 
challenges state sovereignty in order to ensure that the rights at 
stake are protected.46  Even then, in the context of the UNDRIP and 
its protections that safeguard the relationship indigenous peoples 
have to their lands, there are complementary international binding 
agreements that encompass the same types of obligations.47  
Accordingly, where the norms that emerge from the UNDRIP 
intersect with binding international law, the UNDRIP serves to give 
those instruments moral force, and the instruments conversely 
bring the norms set forth in the UNDRIP into a more legally 
recognizable status.48 
Even considering the rising legal influence of international soft 
law, it remains that domestic legal systems have “always been” the 
“primary means of enforcement of international law.”49  The 
UNDRIP can therefore still carry legal significance as it comports 
with treaties and international customary law.  Walter Echo-Hawk 
 
43 See id. (“[U]nder the complexity and dynamism of contemporary international law-
making, international standards may well emerge as a result of the interplay of different 
instruments, regardless of their nature.”). 
44 Id. at 960. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. at 962. 
47 See id. at 972, 973. 
48 See id. at 959.  
49 Walter Echo-Hawk, The Human-Rights Era of Federal Indian Law: The Next Forty 
Years, 62-APR FED. LAW. 32, 37 (2015); see also Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of 
Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 57, 125−26 (1999) (“Beyond international law’s own structures of enforcement, 
domestic legal systems should be looked at as the main engines of enforcing international 
law.  In most domestic legal systems, the authoritative and controlling prescriptions of 
international law have been incorporated as standards of domestic legal systems, invited into 
the categorically different normative system of internal law through, usually, prescriptions of 
the highest rank, such as a constitutive document.  In the United States, treaties, at least 
those of the ‘self-executing’ kind, form part of the ‘supreme Law of the Land’ as defined by the 
United States Constitution.  Customary international law is seen as a standard of federal 
common law to be used by the courts either on the same level of normative strength as acts of 
Congress, or on a level just below.  Courts in the United States, as well as in other domestic 
systems, therefore, remain important battlegrounds for the enforcement of international 
indigenous rights.”). 
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aptly describes the UNDRIP’s effect on United States law as a tool 
in the dynamic process of augmenting the legal effect of 
international human rights law, despite being a non-binding 
instrument in itself: 
[A]t the present moment the declaration is an authoritative 
statement of indigenous rights in the United States, with 
standards that build upon the U.N. treaty obligation of the 
United States to advance human rights under the U.N. 
charter.  In addition, the declaration carries immediate 
power in five important respects: (1) it can be used by tribal 
litigants in carefully crafted test cases to influence courts in 
pending cases as persuasive authority when interpreting or 
reinterpreting federal Indian law doctrines and judge-made 
law; (2) it can guide and influence lawmakers and policy-
makers when making new Indian laws and policies; (3) the 
widely approved international standards are a barometer for 
measuring U.S. conduct, laws, and practices and for judging 
that conduct in the court of world opinion and international 
forums; (4) the U.N. standards can guide Indian country in 
setting the agenda for social and legal reform in the 21st 
century; and (5) as mentioned above, courts can enforce 
those provisions that constitute customary international law 
norms or existing treaty obligations of the United States.50 
Further, tribal legal systems, through tribal attorneys, are a 
critical means for moving the content of the UNDRIP into a binding 
domestic law framework.51  Echo-Hawk further posits tribal legal 
advocates should consider alternative means and development of 
the international norms to best serve the needs of tribal clients: 
Legal advocates continually search for the best forums, the 
best facts and legal theories, and the best strategies for 
meeting their clients’ needs.  Sometimes this search 
entails changing the law and finding new and better forums 
for presenting claims.  This is a proactive process called 
strategic law development.  It can be done on a discrete 
issue-by-issue or client-by-client scale, or it can be done on a 
larger, grander scale by advocates when systematic legal 
problems are at stake.52 
 
 
50 Echo-Hawk, supra note 49, at 37–38.  
51 See id. at 38. 
52 Id. 
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Indeed, the UNDRIP has influence that may prove quite 
significant as the dynamic processes of international and domestic 
human rights law-making continue to unfold.53 
The right to FPIC and the modern conception of FPIC as written 
in the UNDRIP are generally considered to be grounded in the 
rights to self-determination, culture, and use of indigenous peoples’ 
traditional lands, territories, and resources.54  The implementation 
of free, prior, and informed consent would allow fundamental and 
internationally accepted standards for how governing states should 
carry out their responsibilities over indigenous communities as to 
resource extraction to prevail.55  As to natural resource development 
on indigenous lands, Article 32 of the UNDRIP states: “Indigenous 
peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and 
strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories 
and other resources.”56  It confers upon governing states the 
responsibility to “provide effective mechanisms for just and fair 
redress” to a tribe when the governing state itself approves of 
projects that would affect indigenous lands or natural resources.57  
Because of its grounding in indigenous self-determination, FPIC 
requires any entity engaged with indigenous peoples in a manner 
that impacts their lands and resources to first receive their free, 
prior, and informed consent.58  FPIC is designed to replace the 
historical processes that excluded indigenous peoples from decision-
making regarding activities that took place on or near their lands.59  
Free, prior, and informed consent appears at multiple points in 
the UNDRIP.60  Perhaps most notable are Articles 19 and 32.  
Article 19 of UNDRIP requires states to “consult and cooperate in 
good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own 
 
53 See Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative 
Moment in Human Rights, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 173, 215 (2014) (describing the “jurisgenesis” of 
international indigenous rights as a historic and on-going process driven by indigenous 
peoples and advocates). 
54 See id. at 191. 
 55 See id. at 191, 206–13 (2014) (describing several examples of international human rights 
standards contributing to the development of a jurisprudential paradigm favorable to 
indigenous rights, even in the domestic sphere); see also Anaya, International Human Rights, 
supra note 36, at 14 (“Numerous processes within the international system have focused on 
the common set of ongoing problems that are central to the demands of indigenous groups, 
such that there are discernible patterns of response and normative understandings associated 
with the rubric of indigenous peoples.  These international processes now reveal a 
contemporary body of international human rights law on the subject.”). 
 56 G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 1, art. 32. 
 57 Id.  
 58 See Anaya, Extractive Industries, supra note 3, ¶ 26. 
 59 See UN-REDD Guidelines, supra note 5, at 18. 
60 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 1, arts. 10, 11, 19, 28, 29. 
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representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior[,] and 
informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.”61  Article 32 
requires that states obtain “free and informed consent prior to the 
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with the development, 
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.”62 
Two forms of self-determination are reflected in FPIC in the 
UNDRIP: autonomous governance and participatory rights.63  
According to Anaya, “[t]he affirmation of these dual aspects reflects 
the widely-shared understanding that indigenous peoples are not to 
be considered unconnected from larger social and political 
structures.”64  Anaya argues that the rights in the UNDRIP are 
“derived from human rights principles of equality and self-
determination” that are universally applied.65 
B.  Defining FPIC 
In a legal sense, FPIC is currently only applied to indigenous 
peoples and other “traditional peoples.”66  The argument to expand 
the application of FPIC to other communities has been advanced by 
some scholars.67  In the context of development, FPIC can function 
as a signal to interested parties that “indigenous peoples have 
rights and interests that will be protected in the development 
process.”68  FPIC appears in a variety of initiatives, “ranging from 
the safeguard policies of the multilateral development banks and 
international financial institutions; practices of extractive 
industries; water and energy development; natural resources 
management; access to genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge and benefit-sharing arrangements; scientific and medical 
research; and indigenous cultural heritage.”69  The veto power 
 
 61 Id. art. 19. 
 62 Id. art. 32. 
63 See, e.g., id. arts. 4, 5, 18, 27, 41. 
64 S. James Anaya, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post-
Declaration Era, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON 
THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 16, at 184, 193. 
65 Id. at 193. 
66 See, e.g., Hanna & Vanclay, supra note 10, at 148. 
67 See id. 
68 Joji Carino, Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Free, Prior, Informed Consent: Reflections on 
Concepts and Practice, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 19, 25 (2005). 
69 JENNIFER FRANCO, TRANSNATIONAL INST., RECLAIMING FREE PRIOR AND INFORMED 
CONSENT (FPIC) IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL LAND GRABS 3 (2014), https://www.tni.org/ 
files/download/reclaiming_fpic_0.pdf. 
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embedded in FPIC is a critical means to give “the correlative power 
to negotiate on equal terms with the project proponent.”70 
FPIC can only be made freely if it is made without mental or 
physical coercion, external pressures from interested stakeholders 
(government or industry), manipulation, bribery, intimidation, or 
externally imposed timelines.71  It is clear that an indigenous group 
must be given time to “understand, access, and analyze 
information” before giving consent.72  However, there is 
disagreement about the stage in the planning and development 
process at which consent must be obtained.73  Consent can only be 
properly obtained if an indigenous group is adequately informed of 
all of the potential harms and impacts of a proposed activity.74  This 
means that the indigenous group should have accesses to 
information that is “clear, consistent, accurate, constant, and 
transparent,” as well as objective and complete.75  This includes 
access to information in the local language and in a format that is 
culturally appropriate.76  The precise set of actions that constitutes 
consent is yet to be determined.  This is due to the fact that FPIC is 
a relatively new concept that has most often been considered in an 
international, rather than a domestic, context.77  It is clear, 
however, that consent is predicated on the ability for an indigenous 
group to say “no” to a proposed activity, as opposed to mere 
consultation.78  One essential question is exactly whose consent 
must be obtained.  Of course, consideration of all impacted rights 
holders and community members must be included in the process in 
order for there to be free, prior, and informed consent.79  Another 
critical aspect is the inclusion of consent at each phase of an 
agreement’s implementation.80  
Each element of free, prior, and informed consent has legal 
significance.  It is important to note that these definitions are still 
being developed and are often context-specific.  First, consent can 
only be made freely if “given voluntarily and absent of ‘coercion, 
intimidation or manipulation,’” and the process “is self-directed by 
 
70 Goodland, Institutionalized Use of Force, supra note 14, at 344. 
71 See UN-REDD Guidelines, supra note 5, at 18. 
72 Id. at 19. 
73 See, e.g., id. at 24, 25. 
74 See id. at 19. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 See, e.g., id. at 11. 
78 See id. at 20. 
79 See id. 
80 See UN-REDD Guidelines, supra note 5, at 20. 
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the community from whom consent is being sought, unencumbered 
by coercion, expectations or timelines that are externally imposed    
. . . .”81  It is clear that a tribe must be given time to “understand, 
access, and analyze information” before giving consent.82  However, 
there is disagreement about the stage in the planning and 
development process at which consent must be obtained.83 
C.  Modern Contextualization of FPIC 
In the public context, FPIC is seen as a minimum standard for 
nations working with indigenous groups.84  FPIC is recognized in 
multiple articles of UNDRIP.85  Article 32, for instance, states the 
following: 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the 
indigenous peoples concerned through their own 
representative institutions in order to obtain their free and 
informed consent prior to the approval of any project 
affecting their lands or territories and other resources, 
particularly in connection with the development, utilization 
or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.86 
Although the document is not legally binding, this helps 
demonstrate a participating nation’s acceptance of the concept of 
FPIC. 
In the private context, FPIC is developing into an international 
standard for companies operating on indigenous lands.87  Much of 
this progress is a result of shareholders concerned about the 
financial and reputational risks to which their companies are 
exposed when operating on indigenous lands without the consent of 
the impacted community.88  For instance, in 2007, 91.6% of 
Newmont Mining Corporation’s shareholders passed a resolution 
that directed the corporation to assess its practices and policies with 
respect to indigenous peoples.89  Newmont, as a founding member of 
 
 81 Id. at 18. 
 82 Id. at 19. 
 83 See, e.g., id. at 20. 
 84 See FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES GUIDEBOOK ON FREE PRIOR 
INFORMED CONSENT AND CORPORATION STANDARDS 4 (2011), http://www.firstpeoples.org/ 
images/uploads/IPs%20Guidebook%20to%20FPIC.pdf [hereinafter FIRST PEOPLES 
WORLDWIDE, GUIDEBOOK]. 
 85 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 1, arts. 10, 11, 19, 28, 29, 32. 
 86 Id. art. 32, § 2. 
 87 See FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 84, at 4. 
 88 See id. 
 89 Id. at 3. 
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the International Council on Mining and Metals (“ICMM”), recently 
approved an “Indigenous Peoples and Mining” position statement—
created by ICMM—that recognizes FPIC and discusses the 
importance of engaging and consulting with indigenous 
communities that may be impacted by the corporation’s business 
operations.90  The most recent ICMM position statement requires 
that indigenous people should be “able to freely make decisions 
without coercion, intimidation or manipulation; . . . given sufficient 
time to be involved in project decision-making before key decisions 
are made and impacts occur; and . . . fully informed about the 
project and its potential impacts and benefits.”91 
Free, prior, and informed consent is a key aspect in adhering to a 
“rights-and-risks” approach to decision-making regarding energy 
resource development, for example.92  The “‘rights-and-risks’ 
approach explicitly combines human rights impact assessments 
with risks assessments” in ascertaining the stakeholders for these 
decisions.93  Through a proper consent-seeking negotiation with 
stakeholders, tribes should be able to develop energy resources 
without undue interference from outside entities. 
Although the United States and major extractive companies are 
moving toward a respect for tribal rights, it will be tribes 
themselves that are vested with the unique opportunity to 
proactively engage stakeholders with respect to FPIC as a condition 
for companies engaging with a tribe.94  A consent regime recognizes 
this right and this reality, and considers both best interests and 
self-determination.95  Tribes can move toward establishing their 
own “consent regime[s,]” shaping the requirement under Montana v. 
United States96 that nonmembers must be engaged in a consensual 
 
 90 See Strengthening Our Commitment to the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, NEWMONT 
MINING CORP. (May 22, 2013), http://ourvoice.newmont.com/2013/05/22/strengthening-our-
commitment-to-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples/. 
 91 INT’L COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND MINING: POSITION 
STATEMENT (2013), http://www.icmm.com/document/5433 [hereinafter ICMM 2013 POSITION 
STATEMENT]. 
 92 See Carino, supra note 68, at 21–22; see also WORLD COMM’N ON DAMS, DAMS AND 
DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING 219 (2000), 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/sites/default/files/attached-files/world_commission_on_ 
dams_final_report.pdf (discussing the importance of consent in terms of projects and 
negotiating conditions or terms). 
 93 Carino, supra note 68, at 22–23. 
94 See generally FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 84, at 4 (indicating 
that indigenous peoples can use FPIC in both the public and private sector to advocate for 
their rights). 
95 See generally Fletcher, supra note 35, at 119 (discussing how consent theory allows 
tribes to take control over their lands and rights). 
96  Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
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relationship with a tribe in order to fall under tribal jurisdiction.97  
This type of tribal juridical indoctrination can help fortify tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers, helping establish a foundational 
legal landscape supporting the implementation of consent theory. 
III.  INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND FPIC 
The relevant international case law defines “consent” as “the 
canopy for, and is a derivative of, a myriad of human rights, inter 
alia the right to self-determination and self-determined 
development, the right to property . . . the right to practice 
traditional livelihoods, and collective dimensions of rights to health, 
food, life, housing, participation and cultural rights.”98  The 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(“Commission”) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(“IACHR”) grounds FPIC in property, self-determination, and 
culture.99  The IACHR has found that FPIC is derived from rights 
“to cultural identity and right to life,” among others, triggering 
FPIC at a lower threshold with a narrower set of limitations on 
FPIC than solely property rights.100 
The most significant case on FPIC with domestic impacts is the 
1985 case, United States v. Dann.101  Mary and Carrie Dann, 
Shoshone sisters, were attempting to acquire title to their ancestral 
lands, which the United States had appropriated into federal 
property through Indian Claims Commission procedures.102  After 
exhausting domestic remedies, they looked to international 
tribunals.103  The Commission issued a report concluding that the 
 
 97 See id. at 565 (citations omitted); Fletcher, supra note 35, at 119. 
98 CATHAL M. DOYLE, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TITLE TO TERRITORY, RIGHTS AND RESOURCES: 
THE TRANSFORMATIVE ROLE OF FREE PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT 130 (2015). 
99 See Alex Page, Indigenous Peoples’ Free Prior and Informed Consent in the Inter-
American Human Rights System, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 16, 16 (2004); see also 
CATHAL DOYLE & JILL CARIÑO, MAKING FREE PRIOR & INFORMED CONSENT A REALITY: 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE EXTRACTIVE SECTOR 8 (2013), http://solutions-
network.org/site-fpic/files/2012/09/Making-Free-Prior-Informed-Consent-a-Reality-
DoyleCarino.pdf (“In 2003, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, described FPIC as embodying ‘the right to say 
no,’ and being of ‘crucial concern’ and ‘essential for the human rights of indigenous peoples in 
relation to major development projects.’  The current Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
indigenous peoples has argued that we are witnessing the development of an international 
norm requiring the consent of indigenous peoples when their property rights are impacted by 
natural resource extraction.”).  
100 See DOYLE, supra note 98, at 130. 
101 United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 43 (1985). 
102 Id.  
103 See Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 75/02, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc 5 rev. ¶ 1 (2002). 
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United States failed to ensure the Danns’ right to property contrary 
to Articles 2, 17, and 23 of the American Declaration on Rights and 
Duties of Man.104  In part, the court found that a determination as 
to indigenous peoples’ land rights must be based on the consent of 
the whole community, who must be fully informed.105  The court 
found that this did not occur in the Dann case.106  This case 
illustrates the difficulty of operationalizing FPIC even in countries 
with a strong rule of law (in contrast to developing countries).107  
Significantly, the way the United States government handled the 
land negotiations amounted to a violation of human rights.108  The 
case illustrates that FPIC is in part grounded in the inquiry about 
who can rightfully give “consent.”109  The procedural intricacies of 
the case also indicate that international tribunals should better 
develop their own understandings about whether a group of 
individuals has authority to speak for a whole community.110 
In 2001, the Commission considered the collective rights and the 
nature of securing consent in Awas Tingni Community v. 
Nicaragua.111  In that case, Nicaragua granted a Korean corporation 
licenses to cut trees on indigenous community lands, which the 
Nicaraguan government had never demarcated as indigenous 
lands.112  The Awas Tingni community found out about logging 
when loggers were moving onto their territory, after Nicaraguan 
government gave permission.113  Nicaragua failed to compensate the 
indigenous peoples for their losses and the Awas Tingni community 
filed a petition with the Commission in 1995.114  The IACHR found 
that Nicaragua violated Articles 1, 2, 21 and 25 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”) and ordered Nicaragua to 
create a mechanism to demarcate indigenous lands.115  However, 
the legal protections in place were not practiced in reality.  The 
 
104 See id. ¶ 5. 
105 See Page, supra note 99, at 18. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
111 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
112 See Claudio Grossman, Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A Landmark Case for the Inter-
American System, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1, 1 (2001). 
113 See Page, supra note 99, at 16. 
114 See id. at 16, 20 n.6. 
115 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community 
v. Nicaragua, 7 AUSTL. INDIGENOUS L. REP. 37, 38 (2002); see also Awas Tingni Community, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 173 (providing the outcome of the case). 
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IACHR found that Nicaragua had violated the community’s right to 
property by issuing permissions without consent of the 
community,116 based on Article 21 of the ACHR.117  The court also 
found that lands, territories, and resources were particularly 
important to indigenous peoples to preserve spiritual and cultural 
heritage.118  Self-determination played a central role in the decision 
because the decision mandated that Nicaragua could only proceed 
with the participation of the Awas Tingni community.119 
In 2004, the Commission relied on Dann in Maya Indigenous 
Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize,120 finding that land 
rights decisions cannot be made “without the free and informed 
consent of the peoples concerned.”121  There, the Belizean 
government granted concessions to logging and extractive 
companies because the Maya lands were considered “national 
lands.”122  The Commission recommended that the state provide the 
Maya peoples with an effective remedy including recognizing title to 
lands they have traditionally used and occupied in accordance with 
customary land use practices.123  Importantly, the Commission did 
not specifically rely on FPIC as binding international law, but 
located the rights of indigenous peoples in property and spiritual 
and cultural connection to those lands.124  Since 2004, this case has 
moved through various tribunals to enforce the Maya land claims.125 
In 2007 case, the Commission in Saramaka People v. Suriname,126 
found that Suriname had a duty under Article 21 of the ACHR to 
obtain FPIC prior to granting concessions for the exploration and 
extraction of natural resources.127  The IACHR held that the FPIC 
obligation required FPIC be obtained in accordance with the 
Saramaka peoples’ customs and traditions and with recognition of 
 
116 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community 
v. Nicaragua, supra note 115, at 38, 40–41; Page, supra note 99, at 16. 
117 See Page, supra note 99, at 16. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. 
120 Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.122, doc 5 rev. ¶ 1 (2004). 
121 Page, supra note 99, at 19. 
122 See id. at 18. 
123 Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District, supra note 120, ¶ 6. 
124 Page, supra note 99, at 19. 
125 See, e.g., Belize: Advocating Maya People’s Rights to Land, MINORITY RTS. GROUP (Nov. 
22, 2016), http://minorityrights.org/law-and-legal-cases/maya-in-belize/. 
126 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
127 See id. ¶ H5. 
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the Saramaka peoples’ communal property rights.128  The IACHR 
“held that the right to give or withhold consent is premised on the 
nature of the impact to indigenous peoples’ self-determination-
informed right to property over their lands, territories and natural 
resources.”129  Additionally, the court linked the requirement for 
FPIC to the land, as well as cultural and physical survival.130  This 
case affirmed the right of indigenous peoples to give or withhold 
FPIC, which then makes FPIC more appropriately conceived of as a 
“right” because it flows from and is necessary for the realization of 
the right of self-determination, per Dr. Cathal Doyle.131  This case 
also clarifies that indigenous peoples should determine who gives 
consent according to their own traditions and customs.132 
Recently, in 2012, the IACHR held in Kichwa Indigenous People 
of Sarayaku v. Ecuador,133 that Ecuador was liable for breaching 
the Sarayaku peoples’ right to FPIC in accordance with 
international standards by signing contracts with a third party for 
the exploration of hydrocarbons and crude oil in the Sarayaku 
territories, sixty-five percent of which they legally owned.134  The 
third party contracts were signed in 1996; Ecuador signed ILO 169 
in 1998 and the court relied heavily on Ecuador’s obligations under 
ILO 169 in its opinion that FPIC is required and is based on 
indigenous peoples’ rights to life, culture, and communal 
property.135  The IACHR affirmed that the right to consultation 
with the “objective of consent, is derived from the right to cultural 
integrity.”136  The ruling also affirmed that consent should be the 
“objective” of consultations, though the court did not speak as to 
making it a requirement.137  This case is “considered an important 
 
128 See id. ¶¶ H3, H5. 
129 DOYLE, supra note 98, at 129. 
130 See id.; see also David Szablowski, Operationalizing Free, Prior, and Informed Consent 
in the Extractive Industry Sector? Examining the Challenges of a Negotiated Model of Justice, 
30 CANADIAN J. DEV. STUD. 111, 115 (2010) (describing how development decisions need to 
consider the survival of indigenous tribes). 
131 See DOYLE, supra note 98, at 132. 
132 See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185, ¶¶ 18, 22 (Aug. 12, 2008); DOYLE & 
CARIÑO, supra note 99, at 12. 
133 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 (June 27, 2012). 
134 See id. ¶¶ 63–65, 127, 186–87, 341. 
135 See id. ¶¶ 64, 70, 179–81; see also Dani Bryant, Sarayaku v. Ecuador: Lessons in Free, 
Prior and Informed Consultation, FASKEN MARTINEAU (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.fasken 
.com/sarayaku-v-ecuador-lessons-in-free-prior-and-informed-consultation/ (describing the 
obligation under ILO 169).  
136 DOYLE, supra note 98, at 129. 
137 See id. 
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legal precedent[,] as it establishes a legal meaning on how and 
when FPIC should be applied.”138 
IV.  TRIBAL FPIC 
The precedents of the Commission and the proliferation of 
international norms has resulted in many companies beginning to 
explore FPIC rules regarding indigenous interactions, and lay out 
processes to obtain a tribe’s free, prior, and informed consent.  But 
ultimately, self-determination is achieved by indigenous 
communities establishing their own FPIC rules, enabling them to 
take control of their own business interactions. 
In the United States, tribes have a unique opportunity to harness 
the possibility of FPIC by asserting civil jurisdiction over 
individuals acting on its reservation, because of the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Montana v. United States, which states that 
tribes have civil jurisdiction over “nonmembers who enter [into] 
consensual relationships with [a] tribe or its members” and over 
nonmembers who threaten or “[have] some direct effect on the 
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of 
[a] tribe.”139  Tribes in the U.S. therefore have a unique opportunity 
to integrate FPIC into business licenses under a “Law and Order” 
code, thereby creating the necessary consensual relationship to 
ensure that its FPIC code applies to non-Indian businesses 
operating on non-Indian fee land on the reservation under the first 
Montana exception.  This section describes how a tribe may 
integrate an FPIC protocol into its tribal code to ensure its ability to 
prosecute offenders in tribal court.  The section will close by briefly 
discussing considerations that should be made regarding 
enforcement of the code. 
A.  Integrating FPIC as a License to Operate140 
Many U.S. tribes already secure jurisdiction over nonmember 
businesses through their business licensing codes.141  By 
 
138 Hanna & Vanclay, supra note 10, at 152. 
139 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 545, 565–66 (1981) (citations omitted). 
140 There is also the possibility of integrating an FPIC requirement into a Tribal 
Employment Rights Ordinance (“TERO”) process.  FPIC can fit either into a business 
licensing code or a TERO, which generally serves to ensure fair employment and prevent 
discrimination against tribal members in hiring on the reservation.  A tribe could still rely on 
processes developed in a TERO context when drafting an FPIC code to insure reservation-
wide compliance with the FPIC code. 
141 See, e.g., EASTERN BAND CHEROKEE INDIANS CODE § 106-20 (2016).  Often a sworn 
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incorporating FPIC into the already existing business licensing 
code, a tribe will be able to ensure that non-Indian businesses 
operating on the reservation first obtain FPIC. 
To integrate an FPIC requirement into the business licensing 
process, a tribe would require the licensee to comply with FPIC 
either through a tribal law or protocol, or as expressed in the 
UNDRIP.142  It would be preferable for a tribe itself to define the 
process with which businesses must comply in order to obtain a 
tribe’s free, prior, and informed consent and thus meet the business 
license condition.143  Under this structure, if a tribe chooses to deny 
consent, the business would not be able to obtain a license to 
operate on the reservation.144  By requiring consent before granting 
a license, a tribe is ensuring that their consent is obtained before 
any harmful actions are taken by businesses operating within the 
boundaries of the reservation. 
B.  Implementing an FPIC Code: A Case Study 
Working in partnership with an American Indian tribe to develop 
the first of its kind FPIC code in the United States, I developed 
three options for structuring the potential new FPIC chapter of the 
tribal code (“FPIC chapter”), tentatively titled “FPIC code.”  These 
models differ based on the entity that a tribe would like to designate 
as responsible for providing consent.  The three possibilities are: a 
Tribal Business Council (“Council”); a separate entity within the 
tribal government; or the tribal membership.145  This section will 
discuss how each of these decision-making models would be 
implemented and will evaluate the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of each. 
1.  Tribal Business Council 
Under this model, a Tribal Business Council would be solely 
responsible for ensuring that businesses comply with the FPIC 
chapter in obtaining a tribe’s free, prior, and informed consent.  In 
order to comply with the FPIC chapter, the company would likely 
 
statement that the business consents to tribal court jurisdiction as part of the business 
license application is required.  See, e.g., COLO. RIVER TRIBAL CODES § 1-106(6) (2006).  
142 See, e.g., COLO. RIVER TRIBAL CODES § 1-106(6) (providing an example of a current 
application for business license code and protocols). 
143 See, e.g., id. 
144 See, e.g., id. § 1-110 (providing an example of a current denial of license or renewal code 
provision).  
145 See infra Parts IV(B)(1), IV(B)(2), IV(B)(3). 
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have to provide any required information to the Tribal Business 
Council.  The Council would need to set a minimum standard of 
information, which may include how the proposed business activity 
would impact the reservation’s environment, culture, and economy 
both positively and negatively.  The Council would then review the 
information and have a process in place through which to determine 
whether it wants to give consent, thus bringing the company into 
compliance with the FPIC chapter and allowing the company to 
move forward with the chapter on business licensing process.146 
One drawback of this model is that it is time consuming for the 
Tribal Business Council to review relevant information and to make 
an informed decision regarding each proposed business activity.  
The Council may not have the resources to meet these demands and 
the process may prove overly burdensome for companies, possibly 
resulting in a backlog for the granting of tribal business licenses.  
There are a number of ways to address these concerns. 
One option is to refrain from binding the Council to the process.  
FPIC is currently an emerging norm and seen as an aspirational 
goal rather than binding international law.147  A tribe could choose 
to develop the FPIC chapter as an aspirational goal rather than a 
process with which the Council and companies must comply.  
Though this would be less burdensome, it would also greatly reduce 
the positive impacts associated with enacting an FPIC code.  
Another option is to limit application of the requirement to 
particular types of companies.  For instance, a tribe could require 
that only large-scale, for-profit businesses (to be defined in the FPIC 
chapter) must comply with the FPIC chapter.  An additional option, 
discussed below, is to task a commission within the tribal 
government to ensure that businesses are complying with the FPIC 
chapter. 
2.  Separate Tribal Government Entity 
Under the FPIC chapter, a tribe could task an entity within the 
tribal government to ensure compliance with the FPIC code and to 
provide tribal consent.  Possible entities include the tribe’s Business 
License Commission,148 the tribe’s Tribal Employment Rights 
 
146 See, e.g., REVISED LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE SPOKANE TRIBE OF INDIANS § 31-4.06 
(2013) (providing an example of a current code section that describes conditions that must be 
met before a license will be granted). 
147 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
148 See REVISED LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE SPOKANE TRIBE OF INDIANS §§ 31-3.01, 31-
3.03, 31-3.05. 
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Commission Office,149 another preexisting commission within the 
tribal government that would be well-suited for the work, or an 
FPIC commission to be created under the FPIC chapter.  Under this 
model, the entity selected, rather than the Tribal Business Council, 
would be responsible for evaluating information regarding the 
impact of proposed extractive activity and then either deny or 
provide consent.  This may help alleviate the constraints associated 
with the first model. 
This model is advantageous because it relies largely on existing 
resources and structures.  If it were not overly burdensome on the 
entity, implementing an FPIC requirement may be as simple as 
statutorily empowering the tribe’s Business License Commission or 
Tribal Employment Rights Commission Office to assume the duties 
listed above.  Or, if sufficient resources are available, an FPIC 
commission could be established by the same procedure used to 
create the Business License Commission and Tribal Employment 
Rights Commission Office.  Once an entity is chosen, those drafting 
the FPIC chapter could use the language and processes already 
utilized in the tribal code as models for determining how the FPIC 
code will be executed.  For instance, a tribe could look to the TERO 
processes when creating an FPIC commission (or delegating power 
to another tribal entity) and use it to establish the rules, 
regulations, and policies governing the Commission’s duty to insure 
reservation-wide compliance with the FPIC code.  This may include 
looking to the language that establishes the TERO commission, 
defining the duties and powers of the Commission and its Director, 
developing a process for complaints and hearings, and discussing 
enforcement and penalties for violations.150  Another option 
regarding the placement of the FPIC code would be to expand the 
purpose of the TERO code and integrate an FPIC process into the 
TERO code. 
If the Tribal Business Council is concerned about delegating its 
authority to give consent, this model may seem problematic.  One 
way to alleviate that concern, however, is to require Council 
approval of all determinations made by the chosen entity.  Another 
important factor that a tribe should consider, as discussed below, is 
the extent to which it wants to integrate tribal members and 
community stakeholders into the process. 
 
149 See id. § 45-1.1. 
150 See id. §§ 45-3.0, 45-6.0, 45-7.0. 
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3.  Tribal Membership 
Most discussions of FPIC emphasize the need to engage 
individual stakeholders and community members in the consent 
process.  We understand, however, that there are times that the 
Tribal Business Council disagrees with the tribal membership and 
vice versa.  It is ultimately up to a tribe to determine the role of 
tribal members in the consent process. 
If a tribe chooses to engage its members in the consent process, 
the engagement could take a variety of forms.  To ensure that the 
membership remains informed, the FPIC chapter could require that 
information concerning proposed extractive activity and any 
potential impacts is disseminated throughout the community by 
radio, newspapers, flyers, and/or during community meetings.  
Community hearings could also provide an opportunity for those 
members potentially impacted by the activity to voice their 
concerns.  Another option is to have a “comment and feedback” 
period—similar to the process required for Environmental Impact 
Statements151—to allow members to express their support of or 
opposition to a proposed business activity.  If a tribe selects one of 
these methods for soliciting comments from tribal members, it must 
also determine the weight that will be given to those comments.  
Community engagement, which by its nature is an involved and 
lengthy process, has the ability to slow or stall business activity on 
the reservation.  However, it is an important element of FPIC that a 
tribe should meaningfully consider.  If a tribe is concerned about 
delay, it could solicit comments from tribal members regarding 
large-scale development projects only.  Another option would be to 
limit the role of community comment to a persuasive, rather than 
determinative, one; thereby leaving the ultimate decision to grant 
or deny consent with the Tribal Business Council or appointed 
entity. 
C.  Enforcing an FPIC Code: Defining Violations and Choosing 
Sanctions 
Under each of the three models discussed above, a tribe must 
define the conduct that constitutes a violation of its FPIC code, 
which would be prosecutable in tribal court.  One offense could be if 
 
151  National Environmental Policy Act Review Process: Environmental Impact Statements 
(EIS), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/nepa/national-environmental-policy-act-
review-process (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
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a business does not obtain tribal consent “freely.”  “Freely” would be 
defined in the FPIC chapter and could exclude consent obtained 
through fraud, duress, or bribery.  Another offense could be if the 
business does not “inform” a tribe based on the standards provided 
in the FPIC chapter.  A tribe must also determine who is eligible to 
bring a claim for a violation of the FPIC code in tribal court.  That 
will depend largely on which implementation model a tribe chooses 
to pursue.  If the business is found guilty of a violation, it could be 
forced to pay a fine, to mitigate any resulting impacts, or to adhere 
to any other sanctions developed in the FPIC chapter.  A tribe could 
also rely on sanctions codified in the business licensing chapter of 
the tribal code, which may include revocation of the business 
license, fines, and the removal or exclusion of non-Indians from the 
reservation.152 
V.  FEDERAL IMPLICATIONS 
Federal law does not prohibit a tribe—assuming that it has civil 
jurisdiction over the individuals and land in question—from 
conditioning the extraction of its mineral resources on the 
procurement of FPIC.  The 1981 U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Montana v. United States was a “pathmarking” case for determining 
tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.153  In Montana, the Court 
found that tribes lack the “inherent sovereign powers” to regulate 
activities of nonmembers, even on land that is within reservation 
boundaries but not tribally owned, because this power had been 
implicitly divested as a result of tribes’ dependent status.154 
The Montana Court articulated two exceptions to this general 
rule precluding civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.  These 
exceptions are first, situations in which nonmembers have entered 
into a consensual relationship with a tribe, and second, situations in 
which the regulated conduct directly threatens tribal integrity: 
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to 
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on 
their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.  A tribe 
 
152 See generally REVISED LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE SPOKANE TRIBE OF INDIANS § 31-5 
(providing a section of a tribal code that is dedicated to codified sanctions). 
153 See Fletcher, supra note 35, at 100. 
154 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (citations omitted) (establishing 
that relations between tribes and nonmembers is one area in which implicit divestiture of 
sovereignty has occurred); see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194, 
209–10 (1978) (applying the principle of divestiture of inherent sovereign powers over 
nonmembers in the criminal context).  
429 FREDERICKS PRODUCTION (DO NOT DELETE)  
2016/2017]    Operationalizing Free, Prior, and Informed Consent 453 
may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, 
the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements.  A tribe may also retain inherent power to 
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on 
fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens 
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.155 
As Professor Sarah Krakoff explains, the Montana opinion left 
many questions open on tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers: 
Was the Court assuming that exercises of civil jurisdiction 
over nonmembers on tribal lands automatically fit within 
one of the Montana exceptions?  Or was the Court assuming 
that the presumption of tribal authority on tribal lands, even 
over nonmembers, remained intact? . . . Finally, how would 
the Court interpret the second Montana exception?  Would it 
be necessary for a tribe to argue that absent regulation of the 
particular behavior[, a] tribe’s welfare would be imperiled?  
Or would tribes be able to contend that certain exercises of 
self-government are sufficiently connected to what it means 
to be a sovereign that the inability to assert them would 
necessarily threaten their political integrity?156 
In 1997, in Strate v. A-1 Contractors,157 the U.S. Supreme Court 
expounded upon the jurisdictional framework established under 
Montana.  This was a personal injury action brought by a 
nonmember resident of the Fort Berthold Reservation who was 
injured in an automobile accident that took place on a state 
highway located both within the reservation boundaries and atop 
 
155 Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66 (internal citations omitted).  
156 Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil Judicial Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide 
for Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1187, 1209 (2010); see also John P. LaVelle, Implicit 
Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen’s Handbook Cutting-Room Floor, 38 CONN. 
L. REV. 731, 744 (2006) (“Read against the backdrop of previous case law affirming tribal 
powers, these two exceptions can be reconciled with the general proposition that tribes retain 
broad authority in Indian country over the conduct of Indians and non-Indians alike, limited 
only in the rare instance where no significant tribal interest is at stake with respect to the 
conduct of nonmembers on reservation lands owned in fee by non-Indians.  This contextual 
reading of Montana suggests that in most cases tribes’ inherent civil regulatory authority 
over non-Indians and nonmember Indians in Indian country should be cognizable under 
Montana’s exceptions, which must be construed broadly to comport with longstanding 
principles of Indian law.”).  
157 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).  The author wishes to note that the 
nonmember resident in question was the mother of the author’s half siblings. 
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land held in trust for the reservation’s tribes.158  The defendant, also 
a nonmember, was a party to a construction contract with the tribes 
of the reservation.159  The Court made several significant findings in 
this case, including: first, the Montana presumption against civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers applies to both adjudicatory and 
regulatory civil jurisdiction, because “a tribe’s adjudicative 
jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction[;]”160 second, 
despite the trust status of the land underlying the highway, the 
highway was the “equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, 
to alienated, non-Indian land” because the federal government had 
granted the state and the public a right-of-way over the land to use 
the highway, meaning the tribes had “retained no gatekeeping 
right[;]”161 and third, this matter did not meet the consensual 
relationships exception to the Montana presumption due to the 
“non-tribal nature” of the accident and the lack of a sufficient nexus 
between the parties and the tribes: 
The dispute, as the Court of Appeals said, is “distinctly non-
tribal in nature.”  It “arose between two non-Indians 
involved in [a] run-of-the-mill [highway] accident.”  Although 
A-1 was engaged in subcontract work on the Fort Berthold 
Reservation, and therefore had a “consensual relationship” 
with the Tribes, “Gisela Fredericks was not a party to the 
subcontract, and the Tribes were strangers to the 
accident.”162 
Accompanying this analysis of the first Montana exception, 
footnote number eleven acknowledges that tribal police have the 
power to patrol portions of the highway that are within reservation 
boundaries, “including rights-of-way made part of a state highway, 
and to detain and turn over to state officers nonmembers stopped on 
 
158 See id. at 442–43.  
159 See id. at 443. 
160 See id. at 453.  The Court was contextualizing its statement in Iowa Mutual Insurance 
Company v. LaPlante, that “[c]ivil jurisdiction over [the] activities [of non-Indians on 
reservation lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts . . . .”  Id. at 451 (quoting Iowa Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987)).  The Court did so in positing that this statement 
merely stands for the “unremarkable proposition” that tribes presumptively have jurisdiction 
over nonmembers when “tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers . . . 
.”  Strate, 520 U.S. at 453; see also LaVelle, supra note 156, at 756 (“The effect of the Strate 
Court’s unconventional reading of the Iowa Mutual statement was to transform Iowa 
Mutual’s presumption favoring tribal court jurisdiction over the activities of nonmembers into 
a presumption against such jurisdiction, requiring tribes to justify their assertions of 
adjudicative authority over nonmembers under the Court’s Montana test.”).  
161 See Strate, 520 U.S. at 454, 455–56. 
162 Id. at 457 (quoting A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 940 (8th Cir. 1996)).  
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the highway for conduct violating state law.”163 
Some scholars have asserted that the Strate Court’s decision had 
the compounding effects of expanding the Montana presumption 
while diminishing its exceptions.164  One of these arguments rests 
on the viewpoint that the Court’s analogizing of the state highway 
to non-Indian fee land is in preservation of the critical nature of the 
land status inquiry in determining tribal civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers: 
Strate thus appears to have effected a diminishment of both 
Montana exceptions while extending Montana’s “general 
rule”—i.e., Montana’s presumption against inherent tribal 
governing authority over nonmembers—to include (1) tribal 
adjudicative jurisdiction as well as legislative jurisdiction 
and (2) conduct on state highways as well as non-Indian fee 
lands.  Strate’s determination that, for purposes of a Montana 
analysis, the state highway at issue was sufficiently 
analogous to non-Indian fee lands suggested nonetheless 
that the status of the land would remain a crucial threshold 
consideration.165 
Another view presents a spin on the effect of the Strate decision 
on what types of claims can meet the consensual relationship 
exception under Montana, explaining that “but for” causation (i.e., 
incidents that would not have occurred but for the existence of a 
consensual relationship with a tribe) will likely not suffice to meet 
the exception: 
After Strate, it is safe to assume that only claims arising 
directly out of a consensual relationship, such as a breach of 
contract, violation of a licensing, royalty, or other agreement, 
or perhaps a tort arising from the breach of any such 
agreement or arrangement, will suffice.  Arguments that, 
“but for” a consensual relationship with a tribe or its 
 
163 Strate, 520 U.S. at 456 n.11.  
164 See LaVelle, supra note 156, at 757–58.  
165 Id. at 758–59; see Todd Miller, Comment, Easements on Tribal Sovereignty, 26 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 105, 105–06 (2002) (explaining how the Court’s expansion of the Montana rule 
under Strate influenced the Ninth Circuit ruling in Big Horn Country Elec. Coop. v. Adams 
(Big Horn Country Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 955 (9th Cir. 2000)), a case in which 
the Ninth Circuit held that the Crow Tribe could not impose a utility tax on power lines for 
which a private cooperative had obtained an easement, analogizing it to fee simple lands);  see 
also Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001) (“Indian ownership suspends the ‘general 
proposition’ derived from Oliphant that ‘the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do 
not extend to the activities of nonmembers of [a] tribe’ except to the extent ‘necessary to 
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.’” (quoting Montana v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 545, 564–65 (1981))).  
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members, the nonmember would not have engaged in the 
activity on the reservation that ultimately gave rise to a 
legal claim, are unlikely to succeed.166 
The 2001 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Atkinson Trading 
Company v. Shirley167 elaborated upon the Strate Court’s ruling on 
the first Montana exception.  In this case, a non-Indian proprietor of 
a hotel located on fee land within reservation boundaries sued to 
prevent the Navajo Nation from imposing a tax on the hotel 
rooms.168  There, the tribe argued that the hotel fell under the first 
Montana exception because the hotel’s guests benefitted from 
emergency services provided by the tribe (e.g., police, fire, and 
emergency medicine).169  Invoking Strate, the Court rejected this 
argument: 
[A] nonmember’s actual or potential receipt of tribal police, 
fire, and medical services does not create the requisite 
connection.  If it did, the exception would swallow the rule: 
All non-Indian fee lands within a reservation benefit, to 
some extent, from the “advantages of a civilized society” 
offered by the Indian tribe. . . .  Such a result does not square 
with our precedents; indeed, we implicitly rejected this 
argument in Strate, where we held that the nonmembers had 
not consented to [a] Tribes’ adjudicatory authority by 
availing themselves of the benefit of tribal police protection 
while traveling within the reservation.170 
Some scholars have argued that the Atkinson Court was wrong in 
its analysis of the first Montana exception, positing that the hotel 
had voluntarily submitted to the regulatory regime established 
under the applicable “Indian Traders” statutes, thereby creating the 
necessary consensual relationship: 
The Court failed to properly consider the argument that 
Atkinson Trading Post obtained a license from the Navajo 
Nation in order to conduct business on the reservation.  This 
type of “dealing” and “arrangement” meets the consensual 
relationship test on its face.  By engaging in business within 
the borders of the Navajo Nation the petitioner entered into 
a “consensual relationship” with [a] tribe via the regulations 
 
166 Krakoff, supra note 156, at 1215.  
167 Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
168 See id. at 648–49.  
169 See id. at 654–55.  
170 Id. at 655 (first citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137–38 (1982); 
then citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456–57 (1997)).  
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incorporated in the “Indian Traders” statutes.  “The 
regulations reflect a determination that all non-members 
who engage in retail business on the Navajo Reservation, 
have a sufficient nexus with [a] tribe and its members” in 
order to support the tax.  Atkinson Trading Post’s “voluntary 
submission to the regulatory regime,” established by the 
“Indian Trader” statutes, creates a consensual relationship 
with the Navajo Nation, thereby satisfying the first 
exception of the Montana test.  As a result of the Petitioner 
obtaining an “Indian Trader” license, the entire business is 
brought within the first exception under the Montana 
analysis.171 
A remedial measure may be for Congress to enact a tribal 
jurisdictional scheme, as “[a]bsent legislative efforts by Congress to 
return proper control to the tribes, tribal governments will not be 
able to move forward and govern properly.”172 
Professor Matthew Fletcher argues that there exists a double 
standard of consent between tribal governments asserting authority 
over nonmembers and the federal government asserting authority 
over tribes: 
When the Supreme Court speaks about consent of 
nonmembers to tribal governance, the Court robustly 
demands that the tribal government produce literal, express 
consent by nonmembers to tribal authority.  This 
requirement stands in great contrast to the implied, often 
illusory, consent that the Court finds important in the 
context of federal assertions of authority over Indian affairs . 
. . .173 
Fletcher also argues that the overall applicability of the first 
Montana exception is unclear because the cases on this exception 
 
171 See Leonika Charging, Note, Atkinson Trading Company v. Shirley: A Taxing Decision 
on Tribal Sovereign Power, 47 S.D. L. REV. 134, 151 (2002).  The amicus brief for the United 
States conveys regulations as “requir[ing] licensed businesses to comply with tribal health 
regulations and standards for weights and measures, and to make themselves available semi-
annually at meetings of [a t]ribe’s governing body,” and “prohibit[ing] a licensee from selling 
or leasing a building without the consent of both the Bureau of Indian Affairs and [a t]ribe.”  
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Atkinson Trading 
Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (No. 00-454), 2001 WL 185386, at *18; see also 25 C.F.R. §§ 
141.6(b), 141.9(d), 141.17, 141.22 (2016) (providing the specific statutory provisions). 
172 Charging, supra note 171, at 156; see also Fletcher, supra note 35, at 101 (arguing that 
congressional silence on the issue of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers should signal 
courts to abstain from making more common law determinations that unnecessarily 
complicate issues of tribal jurisdiction).  
173 Fletcher, supra note 35, at 109–10.  
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have all involved nonmembers who were “outliers in Indian 
Country,” as opposed to the majority of nonmembers on reservation 
land who do likely have the requisite consensual relationship with a 
tribe.174  First, many nonmembers are employed with Indian tribes, 
and thus have established the requisite consensual relationship.175  
Second, nonmembers live on tribal lands in tribal housing, some of 
whom have signed forms consenting to tribal jurisdiction and 
regulation.176  For these reasons, most aspects of nonmember 
reservation activity meet the requirements set forth in the Montana 
exceptions.177 
Consent theory, even in its confused state, has utility if applied 
properly under the UNDRIP.178  Article 19 of the UNDRIP demands 
free, prior, and informed consent before “adopting and 
implementing legislative or administrative measures” that may 
affect tribes but does not speak to judicial decisions, and courts 
should defer to congressional silence on the issue of civil jurisdiction 
over nonmembers.179 
One important consideration in the FPIC implementation context 
is federal preemption.  However, preemption does not prohibit a 
tribe, assuming that it has civil jurisdiction over the individuals and 
land in question, from conditioning business upon FPIC, but tribal 
regulatory authority is limited by federal law.180  Certainly some 
environmental statutes—the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, 
and the Safe Drinking Water Act—provide for the treatment of 
tribes as states (“TAS”) in administering regulatory programs.181  
These programs, which can be no less protective than their federal 
counterparts, allow tribes to tailor their regulatory efforts to unique 
local conditions.182  The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
determines the extent of tribal jurisdiction under TAS programs on 
a “[t]ribe-by-[t]ribe basis”183 and in addition, 
[R]equir[es] “a showing that the potential impacts of 
regulated activities on [a] tribe are serious and substantial” 
before granting tribes TAS status throughout [a] reservation.  
 
174 See id. at 110–11.  
175 See id. at 115. 
176 See id. 
177 See id.  
178 See id. at 116. 
179 See id. at 117. 
180 See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text. 
181 See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-11(a)(1), 7601(d)(1)(A). 
182 See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(b); 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(B).  
183 See Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal 
Control Over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 627 (1994). 
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However, [the] EPA has stated that “the activities regulated 
under the various environmental statutes generally have 
serious and substantial impacts on human health and 
welfare,” and as a result, [the] EPA has determined that 
tribes will usually be able to make the showing necessary to 
obtain program delegation over all pollution sources within 
the tribe’s territory.184 
For most tribes, the regulatory authority conveyed by TAS 
provisions extends to all activities except the surface mining of 
tribal coal.  Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 
of 1977,185 which regulates the environmental impact of surface 
exploration, mining, and reclamation on Indian lands, the 
Department of the Interior’s Office of Surface Mining Reclamation 
and Enforcement (“OSM”) is the sole permitting authority for the 
mining of Indian coal.186  
Absent a federal-tribal agreement, however, there is no 
provision requiring OSM to consult directly with the affected 
Indian tribes before issuing a permit.  Instead, the 
regulations direct the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to be 
responsible for tribal consultations.  [Accordingly, t]he BIA 
then makes recommendations to OSM concerning permits, 
and OSM determines whether to approve or disapprove the 
[requisite permits] . . . .187 
Therefore, the exercise of tribal regulatory authority would be 
limited to applicable federal authority when the resource at issue is 
tribal coal. 
VI. CORPORATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNDRIP  
Corporations throughout the world must take steps to understand 
and manage risks of opposition from indigenous communities lest 
they suffer avoidable losses.  In November 2014, First Peoples 
Worldwide published the “Indigenous Rights Risk Report” (“Risk 
Report”).188  This report provided quantified risk assessment for 
 
184 Id. 
185 See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (1977) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C. (2012)). 
186 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 17.03[3] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 
2012). 
187 Id. 
188 See FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS RISK REPORT 1 (2014), http://www. 
firstpeoples.org/images/uploads/Indigenous%20Rights%20Risk%20Report(1).pdf [hereinafter 
FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, RISK REPORT]. 
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three hundred and thirty oil, gas, and mining projects conducted by 
extractive industries “on or near [i]ndigenous territories.”189  The 
report identified five risk factors, the “weighted average” of which 
“determined a project’s risk score, gauging its susceptibility to 
[i]ndigenous community opposition, or violations of [i]ndigenous 
[p]eoples’ rights.”190  These factors were: 
 Country Risk: “[T]he strength of legal protections for 
[i]ndigenous [p]eoples, and the degree to which they 
are enforced, in the country where the project is 
located.”191 
 Reputation Risk: “[C]urrent and former negative 
attention to the project, and other projects in close 
geographic proximity, from the media, NGOs, and 
other groups that influence public opinion and can 
affect the company’s reputation.”192 
 Community Risk: “[T]he project’s susceptibility to 
community opposition, and whether the conditions 
are in place for successful community engagement.”193 
 Legal Risk: “[C]urrent and former legal actions taken 
against the project, and other projects in close 
geographic proximity, in the past five years.”194 
 Risk Management: “[T]he project’s efforts to establish 
positive relations with impacted [i]ndigenous 
[p]eoples, and mitigate its risk exposure to 
[i]ndigenous [p]eoples’ rights.”195 
The Risk Report made several significant findings.  First, eighty-
nine percent of the projects assessed had high (thirty-five percent) 
or medium (fifty-four percent) risk exposure to “[i]ndigenous 
community opposition or violations of [i]ndigenous [p]eoples’ rights . 
. . .”196  Risk exposure was higher within the oil and gas industry 
than within the mining industry, which is “possibly attributable to 
the mining industry’s noticeably stronger standards related to 
[i]ndigenous [p]eoples’ rights, compared to the oil and gas 
industry.”197  Second, there is a “direct correlation between Country 
 
189 Id. at 9. 
190 Id.   
191 Id. at 16. 
192 Id. at 17.  
193 Id. at 18.  
194 Id. at 20. 
195 Id. at 21.  
196 Id. at 24.  
197 Id.   
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Risk and projects’ overall risk scores,” meaning that “projects in 
countries with weak or nonexistent legal protections for 
[i]ndigenous [p]eoples were far more likely to receive high risk 
scores.”198  The report then makes the connection between 
governance and business as it pertains to indigenous rights: “These 
numbers indicate that poor governance is bad for business.  
Governments that disregard their commitments to UNDRIP (often 
with the justification that they are obstacles to development) 
actually propagate volatile business environments that threaten the 
viability of investments in their countries.”199 
Further, the Risk Report states that Legal Risk constituted only 
five percent of each project’s overall risk assessment, but that there 
was a trend of growth in the weight of this factor due to increasing 
adherence to the UNDRIP: 
While [Legal Risk] is a smaller percentage of risk than the 
other indicators, First Peoples believes it is the fastest 
growing, evidenced by strengthening legal protections for 
[i]ndigenous [p]eoples’ rights around the world.  Although 
governments maintain that their commitments to UNDRIP 
are aspirational and nonbinding, [i]ndigenous [p]eoples are 
successfully using the document to influence domestic laws 
and court rulings, and stop unwanted projects from moving 
forward.  Not only will this yield more lawsuits against 
companies that violate FPIC, it also renders them 
increasingly liable for retroactive damages from past abuses 
of [i]ndigenous [p]eoples’ rights.200 
The ICMM’s 2013 position statement exemplifies an uneasy 
dynamic between companies and governments vis-a-vis the 
UNDRIP and, in particular, indigenous communities’ right to FPIC.  
As First Peoples Worldwide explains, the 2013 position statement 
diverges significantly from the ICMM’s 2008 position statement.201  
The 2008 Statement warned companies “not to rely too heavily on 
national governments, which may have a history of dismissing 
[i]ndigenous [p]eoples’ ‘distinct identity, legitimate interests, and 
perhaps, their rights as articulated in relevant international 
conventions.’”202  The 2008 Statement also encouraged companies to 
 
198 Id. at 26. 
199 Id.  
200 Id. at 30.  
201 See Mining Council’s “New” Commitment to FPIC Falls Short, FIRST PEOPLES 
WORLDWIDE (June 25, 2013), http://firstpeoples.org/wp/mining-councils-new-commitment-to-
fpic-falls-short/ [hereinafter Mining Council’s “New” Commitment to FPIC]. 
202 Id.; see also INT’L COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, MINING AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: 
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communicate with governments about implementation gaps 
regarding UNDRIP and other international agreements these 
governments have joined.203  The 2013 Statement, on the other 
hand, “allows member companies to rely on the ‘good faith’ of the 
state and removes all language acknowledging that many 
governments have a history of systemic oppression of [i]ndigenous 
[p]eoples”204: 
States have the right to make decisions on the development 
of resources according to applicable national laws, including 
those laws implementing host country obligations under 
international law.  Some countries have made an explicit 
consent provision under national or sub-national laws.  In 
most countries however, “neither [i]ndigenous [p]eoples nor 
any other population group have the right to veto 
development projects that affect them,” so FPIC should be 
regarded as a “principle to be respected to the greatest 
degree possible in development planning and 
implementation.”205 
The Equator Principles is a “risk management framework”206 that 
has been adopted by eighty financial institutions throughout the 
world “in order to ensure that the [p]rojects [these institutions] 
finance and advise on are developed in a manner that is socially 
responsible and reflects sound environmental management 
 
POSITION STATEMENT (2008), http://hub.icmm.com/document/293 [hereinafter ICMM 2008 
POSITION STATEMENT] (“Some governments in the past, and sometimes still today, have not 
recognized their distinct identity, legitimate interests and, perhaps, their rights as 
articulated in relevant international conventions.  Conversely, governments sometimes may 
have concerns that rights or autonomy demanded by [i]ndigenous [p]eoples should not conflict 
with national development priorities or the integrity of the state and any possible 
inconsistencies need to be properly considered.  A range of international instruments exist in 
this area.”).  
203 See Mining Council’s “New” Commitment to FPIC, supra note 201; see also ICMM 2008 
POSITION STATEMENT, supra note 202 (“Legal frameworks should preferably be developed in 
consultation with [i]ndigenous [p]eoples and allow for processes which allow them to 
participate effectively.  Where existing national or provincial law deals with [i]ndigenous 
[p]eoples issues, the provisions of such laws will prevail over the content of this [p]osition 
[s]tatement to the extent of any inconsistencies.  Where no relevant law exists the [p]osition 
[s]tatement will guide member practices.  ICMM members are not political decision-makers 
and cannot disregard national laws or national government policy.  Equally, some national 
legal frameworks may be no more than a minimum requirement for companies seeking to 
build relationships of respect and trust with [i]ndigenous [p]eoples.  Companies may also 
sometimes legitimately point out in discussions with governments any gaps in 
implementation of international conventions which they have agreed to and ratified.”). 
204 Mining Council’s “New” Commitment to FPIC, supra note 201. 
205 ICMM 2008 POSITION STATEMENT, supra note 202.  
206 EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.com/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).  
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practices.”207  The latest edition of the Equator Principles, published 
in 2013, expressly requires that “[p]rojects with adverse impacts on 
indigenous people will require their . . . [FPIC].”208  The principles 
also provide a working definition for FPIC: 
There is no universally accepted definition of FPIC.  Based 
on good faith negotiation between the client and affected 
indigenous communities, FPIC builds on and expands the 
process of Informed Consultation and Participation, ensures 
the meaningful participation of indigenous peoples in 
decision-making, and focuses on achieving agreement.  FPIC 
does not require unanimity, does not confer veto rights to 
individuals or sub-groups, and does not require the client to 
agree to aspects not under their control.  Process elements to 
achieve FPIC are found in IFC Performance Standard 7.209 
This reliance on IFC Performance Standards in establishing 
criteria demonstrates that institutions influencing what types of 
projects receive financing are using international standards for 
guidance, which could put more pressure on both governments and 
corporations to take steps toward UNDRIP implementation. 
VII.  LIMITING UNDRIP 
The four initial objectors to the UNDRIP (the U.S., Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia)210 have managed to maintain their own 
terms on indigenous rights whether in objecting to or in endorsing 
the UNDRIP.  According to one scholar, “[p]atriarchal white 
sovereignty’s possessive logic determines what constitutes 
[i]ndigenous peoples’ rights, and what they will be subjected to in 
accordance with its authority and law.”211 
Attorney Akilah Jenga Kinnison describes a consultation-consent 
 
207 EQUATOR PRINCIPLES FIN. INSTS., THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES 2 (2013), http://www. 
equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles_III.pdf. 
208 Id. at 8. 
209 Id. at 8 n.3; see also INT’L FIN. CORP., IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY: PERFORMANCE STANDARD 7: INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES 50 (2012) (showing how the 2013 Equator Principles’ FPIC standard is consistent 
with that of the IFC Performance Standard 7). 
210 See Megan Davis, To Bind or Not to Bind: The United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples Five Years On, 19 AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 17, 18 (2012). 
211 Aileen Moreton-Robinson, Virtuous Racial States: The Possessive Logic of Patriarchal 
White Sovereignty and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 20 
GRIFFITH L. REV. 641, 644, 656 (2011) (“[T]he possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty 
operates discursively, deploying virtue as a strategic device to oppose and subsequently 
endorse the Declaration.  As an attribute of patriarchal white sovereignty, virtue functions as 
a useable property to dispossess [i]ndigenous peoples from the ground of moral value.”). 
429 FREDERICKS PRODUCTION (DO NOT DELETE)  
464 Albany Law Review [Vol. 80.2 
spectrum that exists in international law, even with the UNDRIP in 
place: 
Although an international consensus has emerged about the 
importance of the principle of FPIC, there remains no 
singular, commonly accepted definition of the term “consent” 
as it is used in articulating the principle.  Rather, a spectrum 
of interpretations of the principle of FPIC has developed in 
addition to the emerging view that different contexts invoke 
different obligations along this spectrum. Thus, 
operationalizing FPIC requires examining the types of 
activities a state considers implementing and their likely or 
possible consequences.  At a minimum, states have a duty to 
engage in prior, meaningful consultation in good faith with 
indigenous peoples concerning activities that affect them.  
The more a particular activity or development project affects 
indigenous peoples and their lands, the greater the required 
level of participation and consultation. . . . [T]he U.N. 
Declaration explicitly recognizes a state duty to obtain full 
consent before moving ahead with a project only in the 
contexts of forced relocation and storage or dumping of toxic 
materials.212 
Kinnison goes on to assert that “there seems to be a shift in the 
international arena toward viewing states’ duty to consult with 
indigenous peoples as falling on the consent end of the consultation-
consent spectrum” for any activity directly affecting their 
traditional lands.213  Kinnison concludes that this is the appropriate 
path for the United States to take as well: 
The United States has articulated a commitment to the 
importance of indigenous consultation both through its 
endorsement of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples and its domestic policies, such as E.O. 
13,175 and President Obama’s Tribal Consultation 
Memorandum.  However, in order to fully realize this 
commitment, the United States should embrace a policy shift 
away from the currently articulated meaningful consultation 
standard.  U.S. law and policy should move toward viewing 
indigenous consultation as involving a spectrum of 
requirements—with good-faith, meaningful consultation as a 
 
212 Akilah Jenga Kinnison, Note, Indigenous Consent: Rethinking U.S. Consultation 
Policies in Light of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1301, 1327–28 (2011). 
213 Id. at 1328.  
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minimum and with consent required in certain contexts, 
including large-scale extractive industries.214 
Neither President Obama’s remarks at the White House Tribal 
Nations Conference in December 2010 nor the “Announcement of 
U.S. Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples” (“Announcement”) appear to represent a shift 
toward the consent side of the spectrum.215  The remarks and the 
Announcement continue to refer to consultation (rather than 
consent) throughout, and the Announcement alarmingly dismisses 
consent as a necessary element of “meaningful consultation” with 
tribes even under the UNDRIP’s FPIC regime: “[T]he United States 
recognizes the significance of the Declaration’s provisions on free, 
prior, and informed consent, which the United States understands 
to call for a process of meaningful consultation with tribal leaders, 
but not necessarily the agreement of those leaders, before the 
actions addressed in those consultations are taken.”216 
This perpetuation of the consultation status quo has not gone 
unnoticed.  In a June 30, 2012, article, a journalist argued that the 
Obama Administration is pursuing a path of least resistance 
concerning the UNDRIP: 
Whether UNDRIP will be successful in the U.S. will depend 
on whether the government chooses to apply it in a way that 
gets past the status quo of current federal-tribal policy. . . . 
Many officials in the Obama administration familiar with 
Indian policy know that UNDRIP adds a new dimension to 
federal-tribal relations.  It’s just that for now the easiest 
 
214 Id. at 1331.  
215 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS 
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 2, 3, 5 (2010), http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/184099.pdf [hereinafter ANNOUNCEMENT]; Remarks by the President 
at the White House Tribal Nations Conference, WHITE HOUSE: OFF. PRESS SECRETARY (Dec. 
16, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/remarks-president-white-
house-tribal-nations-conference. 
216 ANNOUNCEMENT, supra note 215, at 5; see also Update of IFC’s Policy and Performance 
Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, and Access to Information Policy, 
REDD-MONITOR (May 12, 2011), http://www.redd-monitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/IFC 
-policy-review-final-policy-May-12-2011-US-position-to-post.pdf (“With respect to the concept 
of . . . [FPIC], as the U.S. explained at the time it announced its support for the [U.N.] 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the U.S. understands the concept of . . . 
‘FPIC’ to call for a process of meaningful consultation with tribal leaders, but not necessarily 
the agreement of those leaders, before the actions addressed in those consultations are taken.  
In the context of the Sustainability Policy and Performance Standards, the IFC has proposed 
a higher threshold for some projects.  The U.S. supports additional protections for indigenous 
peoples in the context of certain projects with special circumstances.  However, the U.S. does 
not believe there is an international consensus in favor of a definition of FPIC that requires 
the agreement of indigenous peoples.”).  
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course of action is to offer a façade of understanding, while 
largely continuing in a status quo manner.217 
In the June 9, 2011, Oversight Hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs, tribal leaders expressed the need for 
Congress to take legislative action to effectuate free, prior, and 
informed consent.218  The Black Hills Sioux Nation Treaty Council 
brought attention to its 2011 “Resolution of the Black Hills Sioux 
Nation Treaty Council: Rejection of the United States’ Statement of 
U.S. Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples” (“Resolution”) in repudiating the use of federal 
Indian law to limit tribal rights.219  This Resolution contains the 
following condemnation of the U.S.’s Announcement: 
The world has long recognized that the United States has 
lost any moral authority it may have ever claimed with 
regards to human rights or even the international laws of 
aggression and peace.  This statement is further indication 
that, rather than leading in the work in human rights, the 
United States prefers to arrogantly stand outside the circle 
of nations while demanding that others conform to policies 
the U.S. is happy to violate.  They even manage to get in a 
comment that reduces Native Americans (and probably, 
more significantly, our lands and territories) to an exclusive 
right of dominion.  Apparently the State Department and the 
President are comfortable referring to Indians in a 
subservient, unequal and even proprietary manner.220 
The Resolution then provides the following strongly worded 
recommendation for a preferred course of action for the U.S.: 
We would respectfully suggest that a good start at moving 
ahead togethering [sic] would be to honestly endorse the 
Declaration, recognize the human rights of [i]ndigenous 
 
217 Rob Capriccioso, The Obama Administration Now Supports UNDRIP—But that’s not 
Enough, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (June 30, 2011), http://indiancountry 
todaymedianetwork.com/2011/06/30/obama-administration-now-supports-undrip-thats-not-
enough-40428.  
218 See Setting the Standard: Domestic Policy Implications of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 
44–45 (2011) (statement of Fawn R. Sharp, President, Quinault Indian Nation) [hereinafter 
Setting the Standard]; NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., NATIVE PEOPLES–NATIVE 
HOMELANDS: CLIMATE CHANGE WORKSHOP II FINAL REPORT 121–24 (Nancy G. Maynard ed., 
2009), https://neptune.gsfc.nasa.gov/uploads/images_db/NPNH-Report-No-Blanks.pdf.  
219 See Setting the Standard, supra note 218, at 117–18. 
220 BLACK HILLS SIOUX NATION TREATY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION: REJECTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES’ STATEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS 
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 2 (2011), http://www.oweakuinternational.org/_Media/bhsntc-
rejection-of-us.pdf.  
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peoples, and honor the [three hundred and thirty-five] 
treaties that have been broken.  As it stands, the U.S. 
support of the Declaration is a meaningless shell that 
permits the American people and their government to 
continue the colonial policies it has practised [sic] with 
respect to Indian peoples since the settler nation, the United 
States, established its own right to self-determination.  To 
expect that we, as [i]ndigenous peoples, would accept 
anything less is a barely veiled attempt to deny our 
humanity.221 
While the Sioux Nation’s manner of expression may be particular 
to that tribe, the foregoing material shows that the Black Hills 
Sioux Nation is not alone in recognizing that the Announcement of 
U.S. support for the UNDRIP fails to compel deviation from the 
status quo of federal Indian law. 
VIII.  IMPLEMENTATION AND THE CONTEMPORARY CONSULTATION 
SCHEME IN THE U.S. 
Like FPIC, the consultation regime in the United States cannot 
be fully traced back to a single authoritative source.  Rather, it has 
developed over time through statutory language and executive 
actions.  The contemporary executive action that provides the most 
direct guidance on consultation with tribes is Executive Order 
13,175 (“E.O. 13,175”).222  However, events prior to E.O. 13,175 
contributed to the development of a consultation regime.223  The 
following conveys some important pre-executive order events that 
helped build the foundation for the consultation regime as it exists 
today.  In 1970, President Nixon’s Special Message to Congress 
acknowledged:  
[T]hat the federal government had a duty “to provide 
community services such as health, education and public 
safety” to Indian people.  He also noted that only 1.5 percent 
of the Department of [the] Interior’s programs that were 
directly serving Indians were under Indian control.  The 
 
221 Id. at 3. 
222 See Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).  
223 See, e.g., Colette Routel & Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal Consultation in the 
21st Century, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417, 436 (2013); see also Michael Eitner, Comment, 
Meaningful Consultation with Tribal Governments: A Uniform Standard to Guarantee that 
Federal Agencies Properly Consider Their Concerns, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 867, 87476 (2014) 
(describing presidential actions between 1994 and 2000 that emphasized the importance of a 
consultation regime).  
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President admonished Congress and federal officials [to] “. . . 
make it clear that Indians can become independent of 
[f]ederal control without being cut off from [f]ederal concern 
and support.”224 
In 1972, the BIA promulgated its “Guidelines for Consultation 
with Tribal Groups on Personnel Management within the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs” (“Guidelines”), in response to Nixon’s 1970 Special 
Message.225  These Guidelines defined consultation as “providing 
pertinent information to and obtaining the views of tribal governing 
bodies.”226  Allowing for the BIA to determine the level of tribal 
consultation depending on the circumstances, the Guidelines 
proposed that the BIA enter into “agreements with individual tribes 
to ensure that the parties had a ‘clear understanding’ of the scope 
and intensity of tribal consultation.”227 
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 
1975 was: 
[T]he first statute that required consultation with Indian 
tribes in certain circumstances.  The Secretary of [the] 
Interior and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare 
were required to consult with “national and regional Indian 
organizations” while drafting both the initial regulations 
implementing the provisions of the Act and any future 
amendments thereto.  And Congress required consultation 
with any Indian tribe that could be impacted by any BIA 
decision to assist a state in site acquisition, construction, or 
renovation of a school on or near an Indian reservation.228   
Further statutes “require[ed] consultation for federal activities 
that impact Indian historic, cultural, and religious sites,” including 
“the Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, and the 
1992 Amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act.”229  
President Clinton’s 1994 memorandum, entitled “Government-to-
Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments,” 
stated: “Each executive department and agency shall consult, to the 
greatest extent practicable and to the extent permitted by law, with 
 
224 Routel & Holth, supra note 223, at 436. 
225 See id. 
226 Id. at 437. 
227 Id.  
228 Id. at 438. 
229 Id. at 439–40; see, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 3002(b) (2012); Reclamation Projects Authorization 
and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 4006, 106 Stat. 4600, 4757, 4757 (1992) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). 
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tribal governments prior to taking actions that affect federally 
recognized tribal governments.”230 
E.O. 13175, issued by President Clinton in 2000, requires federal 
agencies to “defer to Indian tribes to establish standards” when 
formulating or implementing policies and requires that agencies 
have “an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input 
by tribal officials in the development of regulatory policies that have 
tribal implications.”231  This executive order applies both to 
regulations that “impose[] substantial direct compliance costs on 
Indian tribal governments” and regulations that preempt tribal 
law.232 
There are several notable limitations to the U.S. consultation 
requirement.  First, independent regulatory agencies are merely 
“encouraged to comply with the provisions of this order,” reflecting a 
limited scope of the order’s directive.233  Second, the administrative 
limitations imposed in this order only apply “[t]o the extent 
practicable”234 and there is no guidance in the language of the order 
regarding who or what decides the practicability threshold.235  The 
consultation requirement, while detailed from a procedural 
standpoint, is rather unilateral in nature and does not appear to 
impose any requirements for what constitutes tribal consent or 
whether tribal consent is even a defining element of tribal 
consultation.236  Third, the contemporary consultation regime is also 
 
230 Routel & Holth, supra note 223, at 442; see also Eitner, supra note 223, at 874–75 (“The 
Memorandum directed agencies to build ‘more effective day-to-day working’ relationships 
with tribal governments that reflect respect for tribes as sovereign nations.  Additionally, the 
Memorandum instructed agencies to conduct ‘open and candid’ consultations.  Importantly, 
the Memorandum closed with a notice that it was issued only ‘to improve the internal 
management of the executive branch’ and did not create a cause of action for tribes to enforce 
meaningful consultation.”). 
231 Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,250 (Nov. 6, 2000); see also 
Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881, 57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009) (“My 
Administration is committed to regular and meaningful consultation and collaboration with 
tribal officials in policy decisions that have tribal implications including, as an initial step, 
through complete and consistent implementation of Executive Order 13175.  Accordingly, I 
hereby direct each agency head to submit to the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), within 90 days after the date of this memorandum, a detailed plan of actions 
the agency will take to implement the policies and directives of Executive Order 13175.”).  
232 Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67,250.  
233 Id. at 67,251. 
234 Id. at 67,250. 
235 Id.  
236 See generally id. at 67,250–51 (discussing the fact that the procedural requirements are 
particularly detailed regarding the consultation requirement vis-à-vis direct compliance costs 
on tribal governments; requiring funds needed for compliance to be provided by the federal 
government; consultation with tribes at an early stage of the process and an agency 
statement summarizing tribal concerns as well as the extent to which these concerns have 
been met; and the agency’s position on the necessity of the regulation).  
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defined, and limited, by statute.  In his 2013 statement before the 
Secretarial Commission on Indian Trust Administration and 
Reform, Matthew Fletcher promoted the creation of a congressional 
statute that “would effectively incorporate express Indian and tribal 
consultation and consent requirements into federal Indian affairs 
policy.”237  In doing so, he cites to a number of examples of 
consultation requirements established by Congress.238  These 
examples include the Self-Determination Act, the Native American 
Languages Act, Contract Health Service Administration and 
Disbursement, Indian Law Enforcement Reform, and the Indian 
Civil Rights Act Model Code.239  Fletcher then goes on to cite 
examples of times in which Congress has “severely undercut the 
consultation requirement by giving the federal agencies an out if 
consultation becomes too onerous.”240  In these examples, Fletcher 
points to the same “practicability” language as that which is present 
in E.O. 13,175: 
For example, in the Self-Determination Act: “The Secretary 
is authorized to revise and amend any rules or regulations 
promulgated pursuant to subsection (a) of this section: 
[p]rovided, [t]hat prior to any revision or amendment to such 
rules or regulations the Secretary shall, to the extent 
practicable, consult with appropriate national and regional 
Indian organizations, and shall publish any proposed 
revisions in the Federal Register not less than sixty days 
prior to the effective date of such rules and regulations in 
order to provide adequate notice to, and receive comments 
from, other interested parties.”241 
Fletcher then referred to the following statement by Oneida 
Nation representative Ray Halbritter from a May 17, 2012, 
Oversight Hearing before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs 
as a summary of Fletcher’s argument about the incomplete status of 
the current consultation regime: 
The lifeblood of the unique trust relationship between the 
United States and Indian tribes is consultation, and the 
 
237 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Statement of Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Michigan State University 
College of Law and Indigenous Law and Policy Center Before the Secretarial Commission on 
Indian Trust Administration and Reform 15 (Mich. State U. Coll. of Law & Indigenous L. & 
Pol’y Ctr., Research Paper No. 11-10, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2262790. 
238 See id. at 17–18.  
239 Id.  
240 Id. at 18.  
241 Id. 
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pathway to a robust trust relationship is likely through 
consultation that is redesigned to better meet the needs of 
both parties to the relationship. Although most modern 
[p]residents have recognized the need for meaningful 
government-to-government consultation, consultation 
continues to be regarded by agencies as burdensome and an 
impediment to [f]ederal action rather than a mechanism to 
protect Tribal treaty rights and appropriate [f]ederal 
decision making. Matters are further complicated when the 
[f]ederal government blurs the important distinction 
between [t]ribal consultation and all other communication 
with non-federal interests, even where consultation with 
non-tribal parties may be required by law.242 
Fletcher seems to refer to consent separately from his discussion 
on consultation.243  He identifies six articles in the UNDRIP that 
expressly demand free, prior, and informed consent, including 
Articles 10, 11, 19, 28, 29, and 32.244  He notes a few limited 
examples of instances in which federal agencies have been required 
to obtain consent, but he concludes that “the history of American 
Indian affairs demonstrates conclusively that the federal 
government’s Indian affairs actions take almost no consideration of 
tribal consent.”245 
 
242 Id. at 19. 
243 See id. at 20.  
244 See id.  Fletcher’s examples of instances in which consent was required of federal 
agencies include 25 U.S.C. § 140.  Id. (“The several appropriations made for millers, 
blacksmiths, engineers, carpenters, physicians, and other persons, and for various articles 
provided for by treaty stipulation for the several Indian tribes, may be diverted to other uses 
for the benefit of said tribes, respectively, within the discretion of the President, and with the 
consent of said tribes, expressed in the usual manner; and he shall cause report to be made to 
Congress, at its next session thereafter, of his action under this provision.”).  Additionally, the 
Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a), provides:  
“Where any parent or Indian custodian voluntarily consents to a foster care placement or 
to termination of parental rights, such consent shall not be valid unless executed in 
writing and recorded before a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction and accompanied 
by the presiding judge’s certificate that the terms and consequences of the consent were 
fully explained in detail and were fully understood by the parent or Indian custodian.”   
Id. at 21.  Next, Fletcher discusses 25 U.S.C. § 402a, which provides:  
The unallotted irrigable lands on any Indian reservation may be leased for farming 
purposes for not to exceed ten years with the consent of the tribal council, business 
committee, or other authorized body representative of the Indians, under such rules and 
regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe. 
Id.  Last, Fletcher discusses 25 U.S.C. § 63, which provides: “The President may, in his 
discretion, consolidate two or more agencies into one, and where Indians are located on 
reservations created by [e]xecutive order he may, with the consent of the tribes to be affected 
thereby, expressed in the usual manner, consolidate one or more tribes, and abolish such 
agencies as are thereby rendered unnecessary.”  Id. 
245 Id. 
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A.  A Recent Case Study: The Dakota Access Pipeline 
The 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie established the boundary of the 
Great Sioux Reservation, an area whose territories have continually 
diminished in the last century and a half.246  One of the more recent 
diminutions occurred in 1958 with the passage of federal Public 
Law 85-915, through which Congress revoked treaty lands granted 
to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.247  The law was the culmination 
of government actions committed in the absence of tribal 
consultation, beginning with the authorization of the Oahe Dam 
and Reservoir project in 1944.248  Construction of the dam by the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) began in 1948.249  
The purpose of the dam was to control flooding of the Missouri 
River, to improve irrigation, and to provide hydroelectric power.250  
In providing these benefits, the dam created Lake Oahe, a reservoir 
that submerged almost seven hundred miles of tribal lands and 
displaced thousands of indigenous people.251  The lands that were 
flooded in the construction of the Oahe Dam were the indigenous 
peoples’ most fertile and abundant in wildlife.252  In addition, in 
displacing indigenous peoples from the Missouri River watershed, 
the Army Corps failed to relocate Native American graves.253 
The Oahe Dam was part of the larger Pick-Sloan project, which 
has been described by the scholar Vine Deloria, Jr. as “the single 
most destructive act ever perpetuated on any tribe by the United 
States.”254  The Pick-Sloan Plan, whose primary purpose was flood 
control, authorized and facilitated the construction of several dams 
on the main stem.255  All told, the dams on the Missouri River, 
tributaries not included, submerged over 356,000 acres of Native 
 
246 See History, STANDING ROCK, http://standingrock.org/history/ (last visited Feb. 21, 
2017). 
247 Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-915, § 1, 72 Stat. 1762, 1762 (providing for 
acquisition of Standing Rock Reservation lands by the United States). 
248 See id.  
249 See Lake Oahe, S.D. MO. RIVER TOURISM, http://sdmissouririver.com/follow-the-river/ 
the-four-lakes-and-dams/lake-oahe/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2017). 
250 See Peter Capossela, Impacts of the Army Corps of Engineers’ Pick-Sloan Program on 
the Indian Tribes of the Missouri River Basin, 30 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 144, 144–45 (2015). 
251 See Christina Rose, Echoes of Oak Flat: 4 Pick Sloan Dams that Submerged Native 
Lands, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (Sept. 11, 2015), https://indiancountrymedia 
network.com/history/events/echoes-of-oak-flat-4-pick-sloan-dams-that-submerged-native-
lands/. 
252 See Ojibwa, Dam Indians: The Missouri River, NATIVE AM. NETROOTS (Mar. 10, 2010), 
http://nativeamericannetroots.net/diary/406. 
253 See Capossela, supra note 250, at 158 & n.115. 
254 Id. at 157–58. 
255 See id. at 144–45. 
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American lands and devastated precious resources and historically 
significant sites.256  Displaced indigenous peoples relocated to 
barren lands with inadequate infrastructure, which the Army Corps 
was required by law to improve but never did.257  Most affected were 
the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nations; the Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe; the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe; the Crow Creek Sioux 
Tribe; the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe; the Yankton Sioux Tribe; and 
the Nebraska Tribe.258  Though Congress provided monetary 
compensation to the tribes, the devastating effects of Pick-Sloan 
persist today in the form of poverty and continued conflicts over 
tribal lands.259  Particularly, the tainted history of Lake Oahe has 
resurfaced in the ongoing Dakota Access Pipeline controversy.260   
In terms of the pipeline’s location and capacity: 
The Dakota Access Pipeline is a 1,168-mile-long pipeline 
that, if completed, would carry 570,000 barrels of crude oil 
daily from the Bakken region of North Dakota across four 
states to refineries in southern Illinois. . . . The pipeline 
[would] run[] near the Missouri River, upstream of the water 
supply of numerous tribal nations, and [would] cross[] under 
the river at Lake Oahe, less than one mile north of the 
Standing Rock Sioux Reservation.261 
 The pipeline would go across land that was promised to the Great 
Sioux Nation in the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851.262  The pipeline 
would intersect the treaty reservation and traditional territories of 
the Great Sioux Nation, lands to which the various modern-day 
Sioux Tribes continue to have strong cultural, spiritual, and 
historical ties.263 
 
256 See id. at 145. 
257 See id.  
258 See id. at 155–56.  The author wishes to acknowledge that she is a member of the 
Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation, and that her father’s childhood home and community 
was a casualty of the flooding. 
259 See id. at 179, 216–17. 
260 See Aaron Sidder, Understanding the Controversy behind the Dakota Access Pipeline: 
What to Know as Protestors and the Oil Company Continue to Clash, SMITHSONIAN (Sept. 14, 
2016), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/understanding-controversy-behind-
dakota-access-pipeline-180960450/.  
    261  Letter from David Archambault II, Chairman, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe et al., to 
Emilio Álvarez Icaza Longoria, Exec. Sec’y, Inter-American Comm’n on Human Rights (Dec. 
2, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/12/09/document_pm_03.pdf [hereinafter 
Standing Rock Letter]. 
262 See Steven Mufson, A Dakota Pipeline’s Last Stand, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-dakota-pipelines-last-stand/2016/11/25 
/35a5dd32-b02c-11e6-be1c-8cec35b1ad25_story.html?utm_term=.b678ff2461d3. 
263 See Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Standing Tall: The Sioux’s Battle against a 
Dakota Oil Pipeline is a Galvanizing Social Justice Movement for Native Americans, SLATE 
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The Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in North Dakota and 
South Dakota is the sixth largest Indian reservation in the 
United States.  The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe has 
approximately [eighteen thousand] enrolled members.  The 
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation is adjacent to the 
Standing Rock Sioux Reservation to the south.  Like 
Standing Rock, Cheyenne River’s eastern border is Lake 
Oahe.  The Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation is the fourth 
largest Indian reservation in the United States.   The 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe has [sixteen thousand] enrolled 
members.  The Yankton Sioux Reservation borders the 
Missouri River in southern South Dakota. The Yankton 
Sioux Tribe has approximately [nine thousand] members.264   
Without an “adequate social, cultural or environmental 
assessment, . . . on July 25, 2016, the Corps gave multiple domestic 
authorizations permitting the construction of [the Dakota Access 
Pipeline].  One such authorization permitted construction beneath 
the Missouri River at Lake Oahe, while another authorized the 
discharge of materials and waste into waters throughout the 
[t]ribes’ ancestral lands.”265  The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe filed a 
lawsuit against the Army Corps in United States district court, 
alleging that in granting the permit without consulting with the 
tribal government the agency violated multiple domestic statutes, 
including the National Environmental Policy Act, the National 
Historic Preservation Act, the Rivers and Harbors Act, and the 
Clean Water Act.266  The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, downstream 
from Standing Rock Reservation, joined the Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe in its suit late in August.267  In September, the Yankton Sioux 
 
(Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/09/why 
_the_sioux_battle_against_the_dakota_access_pipeline_is_such_a_big_deal.html.  The Great 
Sioux Nation refers to the historical political structure of the indigenous people residing in 
the Northern Great Plains region of the United States.  See The Sioux, BUFFALO BILL CTR. 
WEST, https://centerofthewest.org/explore/plains-indians/paul-dyck-collection-sioux/ (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2017).  As a result of decades of federal policies aimed at breaking up the 
tribes and bands, “[t]oday, the Sioux maintain many separate tribal governments scattered 
across several reservations, communities, and reserves in the Dakotas, Nebraska, Minnesota, 
and Montana . . . .”  Id. 
264 Standing Rock Letter, supra note 261. 
265 Id.  
266 See Complaint at 2, 17, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 
1:16-cv-01534 (D.D.C. July 27, 2016). 
267 See Blake Nicholson, Deadline Looms for Dakota Access Pipeline Protest Camp, CHI. 
TRIBUNE (Feb. 20, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-dakota-access-
pipeline-camp-deadline-20170220-story.html; Levi Rickert, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Now 
Part of Dakota Access Pipeline Lawsuit, NATIVE NEWS ONLINE (Aug. 22, 2016), http://native 
newsonline.net/currents/cheyenne-river-sioux-tribe-now-part-dakota-access-pipeline-lawsuit/. 
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Tribe filed its own lawsuit against the Army Corps and the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service.268   
Tribes have long been connected to these lands for multiple 
reasons: 
The culture and identity of the [t]ribes are deeply connected 
to the land and waters of their traditional territories.  
Because of a history of colonization, dispossession, and 
genocidal government policies, the [t]ribes have lost, or 
nearly lost, important parts of their land, language, stories, 
and history.  Their connection to sacred, cultural and 
historical sites associated with their traditional territories is 
essential to maintaining what remains of their culture and 
identity.269 
Because of this deep connection and spiritual relationship, 
members from the tribes began a prayer camp to protest the 
pipeline.270 
The controversy surrounding [the Dakota Access Pipeline]. . . 
[drew] thousands of people—members of the [t]ribes and 
many indigenous and non-indigenous members of civil 
society not formally associated with the [t]ribes—to the 
banks of the Missouri River outside of Cannon Ball, North 
Dakota, near where [the Dakota Access Pipeline] would cross 
under the river, for prayer and peaceful protest in defense of 
the lands, resources, cultural property, and waters 
threatened by [the Dakota Access Pipeline].  Spanning over 
[seven] months, this gathering . . . [was] the largest 
gathering of indigenous peoples in the United States in more 
than [one hundred] years.271 
In response to the tribes’ concerns and public outcry from across 
the globe, in September 2016 the Army Corps called for a halt on 
construction of the pipeline on land bordering or beneath Lake 
Oahe.272  In December 2016, the Standing Rock, Cheyenne River, 
 
268 See ICMN Staff, Yankton Sioux Tribe Sues US Army Corps, USFWS Over Dakota 
Access, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.indiancountry 
medianetwork.com/news/native-news/yankton-sioux-tribe-sues-us-army-corps-usfws-over-
dakota-access/.  
269 Standing Rock Letter, supra note 261. 
270 See id. at 7. 
271 Id. 
272 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Joint Statement from the Dep’t of Justice, the 
Dep’t of the Army & the Dep’t of the Interior Regarding Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint-statement-
department-justice-department-army-and-department-interior-regarding-standing.  
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and Yankton Sioux Tribes were granted a thematic hearing before 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to address 
concerns over violations of human rights to life, personal integrity, 
health, property, access to information, public participation in 
decision-making, and access to justice.273  Additionally, the tribes 
requested that the Commission call upon the United States 
government to adopt precautionary measures to safeguard the 
rights to culture, personal security, health, and property of the 
indigenous peoples involved.274  
 On December 4, 2016, the Army Corps announced its decision to 
deny the final easement necessary for construction pending the 
development of a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement, 
which is to be developed in close collaboration with the tribes.275  
However, on January 20, 2017, Donald Trump was sworn in as the 
President of the United States.276  Days after entering office, 
President Trump issued a presidential memorandum which called 
on the Army Corps to take expedited action to review and approve 
requests for approvals to construct the pipeline.277  On February 7, 
the Army Corps announced that it will grant the final approval 
needed to complete construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, 
without conducting an Environmental Impact Statement.278  On 
February 9, the Cheyenne River Tribe filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction to halt construction until the validity of the 
Army Corps’ action could be determined.279  The Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe also challenged the easement on the grounds that the 
Environmental Impact Statement was wrongfully terminated.280 
This case represents the contemporary challenges in the United 
States to realization of FPIC by indigenous peoples, as well to the 
 
273 See Standing Rock Letter, supra note 261. 
274 See id. 
275 See Press Release, U.S. Army, Army Will Not Grant Easement for Dakota Access 
Pipeline Crossing (Dec. 4, 2016), https://www.army.mil/article/179095/army_will_not_grant 
_easement_for_dakota_access_pipeline_crossing. 
276 See Presidential Inauguration 2017, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/inauguration-2017 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017). 
277 See Memorandum on Construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, 2017 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 67 (Jan. 24, 2017). 
278 See Timothy Cama, Trump Administration Giving Final Green Light to Dakota Access 
Pipeline, HILL (Feb. 7, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/318341-trump-
admin-to-approve-dakota-access-oil-pipeline.  
279 See Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, No. 1:16-cv-1534 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2017). 
280 See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Asks Federal Court to Set Aside Trump’s Pipeline 
Reversal; Critical Motion Charges Trump Administration Circumvents Law and Ignores 
Treaty Rights, EARTHJUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/features/faq-standing-rock-litigation 
(last updated Feb. 14, 2017). 
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human rights described in the UNDRIP.281  The U.S. government 
did not apply the standard of FPIC to meaningfully consult tribal 
governments and consider the impacts on tribal governments within 
the meaning of FPIC because if failed to include impact analysis on 
any tribal lands or reservations despite the proximity of the 
Standing Rock Sioux, Ft. Berthold, and Cheyenne River Sioux 
Reservation.282  Applying the UNDRIP’s FPIC standard, a project 
impacting the lands, territories, and resources of the Tribes should 
not occur without adequate consultations with, and the free, prior 
and informed consent of, the indigenous populations concerned.283 
B.  Implications of the Indian Reorganization Act 
In 1933, Nathan Margold appointed Felix Cohen and Melvin 
Siegel to draft the Indian Reorganization Act.284  A number of 
external materials may have influenced how the bill was drafted 
and later amended, though knowledge of the facts surrounding 
these sources is incomplete.  Notable amongst these sources, 
 
281 A full examination of the facts and issues surrounding the Dakota Access Pipeline 
conflict is the subject of a forthcoming article by the author. 
282 See, e.g., Letter from Lawrence S. Roberts, Acting Assistant Sec’y—Indian Affairs, Dep’t 
of the Interior, to Brent Cossette, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Mar. 29, 2016), 
http://indigenousrising.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/DOI-Signed-Standing-Rock-Corps-
Letter.pdf [hereinafter DOI Letter].  Three separate federal agencies—the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Department of the Interior, and the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation—as well as the Standing Rock Sioux tribal government itself, allege that the 
Army Corps failed to meaningfully engage the Standing Rock Sioux tribal government at any 
point in their assessment process leading to the recent authorizations and subsequent 
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline.  See DOI Letter; Letter from Reid J. Nelson, Dir., 
Advisory Council on Historic Pres., to Lieutenant Gen. Thomas P. Bostick, Commanding Gen. 
& Chief of Eng’rs, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (May 19, 2016), http://www.achp.gov/docs/nd-sd-
ia-il.coe.dakota%20access.con04.19may16.pdf [hereinafter ACHP Letter]; Letter from Philip 
S. Strobel, Dir., Nat’l Envtl. Policy Act Compliance & Review Program, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
to Brent Cossette, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Mar. 11 2016), http://indigenousrising.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Dakota-Access-2nd-DEA-cmts-3-11-16.pdf [hereinafter EPA Letter].  
Each of the three federal agencies wrote separate letters to the Army Corps, and these 
sources claim that although the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and others have repeatedly 
sought consultation with the Army Corps throughout their review process, the Army Corps 
had yet to meaningfully engage or coordinate with any tribe while carrying out their cultural 
and environmental impact studies relating to the pipeline.  See ACHP Letter; DOI Letter; 
EPA Letter.  The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation’s letter specifically outlined 
concerns regarding the Army Corps’ lack of consultation with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.  
See ACHP Letter.  The Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the 
Interior’s letters also indicated that, in their judgment, the Army Corps failed to meet the 
government-to-government consultation requirements mandated in the domestic laws of the 
United States.  See DOI Letter; EPA Letter. 
283 See G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 1, arts. 1, 2, 8, 11, 12, 18, 19, 28, 29, 37, 38. 
284 See ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT 192–93 (2000).  
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though, is the “Tentative Statement of Indian Land Policy” 
(“Shepard document”).285  This document has no known author but 
is presumed to have been authored by former BIA forestry expert 
Ward Shepard.286  Former BIA Commissioner John Collier had 
identified Shepard as one of the “chief producers of ideas” for the 
bill.287  The Shepard document assumed “the truth of the vacuum 
theory of Indian political life—that most tribal institutions had 
disappeared.”288  Author Elmer Rusco describes the crux of the 
proposal contained in the Shepard document as follows:  
“[Twenty] or more families should be gathered into a small 
village, with a school and community house, gardens, water 
supply, etc., and from this center should use their individual 
allotments or tribal lands, as the case may be.”  What 
Shepard had in mind was a program for establishing model 
communities, created by “expert” Bureau officials. . . . In 
general, there is nothing in his initial approach that shows 
an awareness of existing Native American structures or any 
sense that these should be recognized and strengthened.289   
According to Rusco, Cohen and Siegel’s approach to bill drafting 
reflected the same basic ideas: “[T]he Cohen-Siegel approach . . . 
assumed that the central purpose of the land policy was to bring 
about the organization of Indians into communities, although . . . 
[t]here was no suggestion of organization at the reservation level; in 
fact, it was proposed that some communities could be established 
among ‘scattered’ Indians . . . .”290 
Rusco later explains the importance of the “vacuum theory” in 
drafting the bill: 
A key underlying assumption of the drafters was the vacuum 
theory.  The allotment program and other aspects of 
governmental policy over several decades, which effectively 
were part of the forced assimilation ideology dominating 
Indian policy since 1887, were thought to have destroyed 
most Indian governments and even a good deal of Indian 
social structure.  Collier certainly knew that Native 
American societies already had self-governing authority, as 
 
285 See id. at 195.  
286 See id. at 194, 195. 
287 Id. at 194. 
288 Id. at 195. 
289 Id. at 196. 
290 Id. at 197.  This approach was embodied in a “draft-outline of a bill” contained in a 
memorandum signed by both Siegel and Cohen one day after the Shepard memorandum.  See 
id.  
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recognized by the courts, but the emphasis was on creating 
new governments or cooperative organizations rather than 
on supporting or strengthening existing governments.291 
The initial congressional hearings on the draft bill exposed some 
complicated and confusing aspects of the initial draft.292  At the 
February 27, 1934, hearing, some congressmen expressed concern 
as to whether Indians would make decisions in their best interests 
considering the complex disposition of their land rights under the 
bill and how to handle the consolidation of Indian communities in 
areas in which whites had bought valuable tracts of land from 
Indians and had made investments in that land.293  A 
representative of the Crow Indians raised this latter concern, and 
committee member Hubert H. Peavey made the following statement 
of optimism that yields some examination concerning the perceived 
purpose of the bill at the time: 
Mr. Commissioner, it is true, that while the statement of Mr. 
Yellow Tail to the committee shows many of the obstacles 
and problems to be overcome in the settlement of these 
various Indian situations under the terms of this bill, it also 
presents a very hopeful phase of it in the fact that everything 
that he has presented to this committee is what is typical of 
the ordinary white community; and we are expecting and 
trying by this bill to raise the Indian people up to the level of 
the white communities in their affairs.294 
Evidence of later congressional deliberations on an amended 
version of the bill is evident in a 2014 memorandum to the 
Secretary of the Interior addressing the meaning of “under federal 
jurisdiction” under the Indian Reorganization Act.295  In this memo, 
it is suggested that in a House committee hearing on May 17, 1934, 
Collier proposed adding “under federal jurisdiction” after 
 
291 Id. at 205.  
292 See, e.g., Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearing on H.R. 7902 Before the H. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 73rd Cong. 126 (1934) [hereinafter Readjustment of Indian Affairs]; see also 
THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT: CONGRESSES AND BILLS 20–23 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed., 2002) 
(providing the complete text of the original proposed bill).  
293 See, e.g., Readjustment of Indian Affairs, supra note 292, at 126, 127, 134, 136, 137, 
138.  During the hearing, Collier succinctly explains the basics of the new proposed land 
ownership regime as follows: “In effect, the allotted Indian, whose land goes into the 
community, keeps what he has got and gets the additional amount represented by his share 
in the new land as a member.”  Id. at 128. 
294 Id. at 138. 
295 See Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Off. of the Solicitor, to Sec’y of the Interior 
on the Meaning of “Under Federal Jurisdiction” for Purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act 
1 (Mar. 12, 2014), https://solicitor.doi.gov/opinions/M-37029.pdf. 
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“recognized Indian tribe” in order to appease Senators Thomas and 
Fraziers’ concerns regarding whether Indians such as the 
Catawbas, who maintained tribal identity but “were not members of 
tribes and were not enrolled, supervised, or living on a 
reservation[,]” could be accounted for under the act.296 
Much of the current discourse related to the Indian 
Reorganization Act surrounds the 2009 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Carcieri v. Salazar.297  In that case, the Court decided 
that the Secretary of the Interior would not accept land in trust 
from an Indian tribe that was not recognized at the time the Indian 
Reorganization Act was passed.298  The relevant provision in the 
Indian Reorganization Act (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 479) allowed the 
Secretary to accept trust land from any “recognized Indian tribe 
now under [f]ederal jurisdiction.”299  The Court defined “now” as the 
time in which the act was passed.300 
In 2011, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held an 
oversight hearing to discuss the contents and the implications of the 
Carcieri decision.301  In his opening statement, Hawaiian U.S. 
Senator Daniel K. Akaka stated that the Supreme Court was wrong 
in Carcieri: 
[A] Supreme Court decision in 2009 narrowly construed the 
text of the [Indian Reorganization Act] and completely up-
ended the status quo, which had existed for [seventy-five] 
years, contrary to [c]ongressional intent, legislative history, 
and affirmative actions by the Administration.  I have a 
great deal of respect for the Supreme Court and the hard 
work that they do.  However, when the [C]ourt gets it wrong, 
it is the responsibility of Congress to fix it.  That is why this 
 
296 See id. at 10, 11.   
297 Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); see, e.g., Scott A. Taylor, Taxation in Indian 
Country after Carcieri v. Salazar, 36 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 590, 591 (2010) (discussing the 
potential tax implications of the decisions); see also Amanda D. Hettler, Note, Beyond a 
Carcieri Fix: The Need for Broader Reform of the Land-into-Trust Process of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1380 (2011) (discussing the inefficient 
administration of the processes by which land can be taken into trust for Indians through 
both pre-Carcieri and post-Carcieri administrative frameworks).  
298 See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 395. 
299 Id. at 382 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012) (“The term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall 
include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now 
under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, 
on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall 
further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.”)). 
300 See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 395.  
301 See The Indian Reorganization Act—75 Years Later: Renewing Our Commitment to 
Restore Tribal Homelands and Promote Self-Determination: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2011).  
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[c]ommittee at its first business meeting in the 112th 
Congress passed a Carcieri fix out of [c]ommittee.  My 
Carcieri fix bill does nothing more than to simply restore the 
status quo that existed for [seventy-five] years and affirms 
the original intent of the Indian Reorganization Act to 
restore tribal homelands and empower tribal governments to 
exercise self-determination.302 
Professor G. William Rice proposes a two-part fix to the Carcieri 
decision: 
The first section requires implementation of the original 
intent of the [Indian Reorganization Act] in that lands 
acquired by federally incorporated tribes would be 
nontaxable Indian country when acquired within a 
reservation or former reservation at the behest of the tribes.  
In addition, the tribe, not the Secretary of the Interior, would 
have management and operational control over said 
properties subject only to the limited restrictions stated in 
the statutory language or those set out in the applicable 
charter with the consent of the tribe.303 
Rice refers heavily to the UNDRIP in framing the proposed 
Carcieri fix, particularly with regard to how Rice feels the term 
“Indian” should be defined.304  Rice also purports “to achieve a basic 
level of compliance with at least some of the standards set out in the 
[d]raft [d]eclaration with respect to the rights of [i]ndigenous 
peoples to land, territory, and resources” in his proposed fix.305 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
A tribal FPIC law and protocol may serve as a self-determined 
model to actualize indigenous rights as described in the UNDRP 
 
302 Id. at 1–2; see also Rob Capriccioso, So Close! How the Senate Almost Passed a Clean 
Carcieri Fix, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Sept. 19, 2013), http://indian 
countrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/09/19/how-clean-carcieri-fix-almost-passed-senate-
151346 (providing an in-depth discussion of the congressional fate of Akaka’s proposed 
Carcieri “fix”); Paul Moorehead, The ‘Carcieri’ Fix Bills Need to Do More, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (July 30, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com 
/2014/07/30/carcieri-fix-bills-need-do-more (“Eighty years later, Indian tribes continue to 
grapple with the same problems, only made worse by decades of further land fractionation 
and a legal regime of Indian land management that has failed to adapt to changing 
circumstances on the ground in tribal communities.”). 
303 G. William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri “Fix”: Updating the Trust Land Acquisition 
Process, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 594 (2009).  
304 See generally id. at 598 (invoking Articles 9 and 33 of the UNDRIP).  
305 Id. at 608 (referring to the draft declaration).  
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regarding the development or use of culture, lands, territories, and 
resources, and would serve to tribally implement concepts of the 
UNDRIP, moving away from the outmoded domestic processes of 
consultation and the Indian Reorganization Act.  Indigenous 
peoples in the U.S. have a unique opportunity under Montana to 
develop and implement their own FPIC protocol in order to assert 
their human rights, and a model under United States law for Indian 
tribes to assert their sovereign and human rights without waiting 
for member state implementation may serve as a starting point for 
indigenous peoples globally to actualize the same. 
